Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 10.djvu/336

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Churchill
328
Churchill

detachments, and were even superior in number; but they had to supply many garrisons, and the discouragement of their troops gave Marlborough confidence. He moved upon Menin, reputed to be one of the masterpieces of Vauban, the possession of which would open the road into French territory, and bring Lille within reach. The place was invested on 23 July; and although Vendôme, who now arrived at Valenciennes to take the command, tried to interrupt the siege, it finally surrendered on 23 Aug. Vendôme now took up a position to defend Lille; but Marlborough resolved to secure Dendermond, on the Scheldt, which had hitherto been only blockaded. Dry weather favoured a siege for which Louis was reported to have said that an 'army of ducks' would be necessary (Coxe, ii. 77). It surrendered on 5 Sept., and finally Ath upon the Dender was taken on 4 Oct. Marlborough was anxious to complete his triumphs by taking Mons; but the Dutch were backward, and he closed a campaign of extraordinary success by sending his troops to winter quarters in November.

Marlbrough's victory had thus transferred to the allies a great part of the barrier of fortresses. He was in command of the great system of water communication in the Netherlands, and had a new communication with England through Ostend. He was thus in a position to threaten the French frontier. But his victories led to an outburst of jealousy; it was more difficult than ever to hold the confederacy together, and which carrying on his campaign he was involved in the most troublesome negotiations. Upon the conquest of Brabant the emperor immediately filled a blank power of appointment left by his brother as king of Spain, thus assigning the administration of the Belgic provinces to Marlborough. The appointment would bring in 60,000l. a year besides the honour. The Dutch, however, protested energetically. Their whole aim in the war was precisely to gain a barrier for themselves, and they naturally did not wish the stakes to be held by their allies (see the letter of the States-General to the emperor, Heinsius Correspondence, pp. 73–9). They had endangered their finances, and their armies had done a lion's share of the fighting. If the deputies had objected to battles, they had at least placed large forces in the field with more punctuality than any of the allies. If they were nervous about fighting, they were in the most exposed situation. In any case their co-operation was essential; Marlborough had to yield, and a provisional government was appointed to be administered by England and Holland in the name of Charles. A fresh offer to Marlborough from Charles himself renewed the jealousy. Marlborough kept his eye upon the post and received fresh offers from the emperor in later years. In 1710 he applied for a fulfilment of this promise in view of his loss of influence at home, but was finally put off with an evasive answer (Coxe, iii. 336). Fresh troubles were produced by the complicated intrigues arising in the court of Charles, who was carrying on an unsuccessful campaign in Spain. The Earl of Peterborough quarrelled with Charles and his colleagues, appealed to Marlborough and Godolphin, flattered the duchess, and complained of his neglect. Marlborough, amid his various anxieties, had to correspond with Charles, and try to arrange schemes for a more effective warfare in Spain. Meanwhile Louis was taking advantage of the jealousies among his enemies. A secret correspondence was opened with Marlborough through the elector of Bavaria. Other negotiations were opened with the Dutch. Louis offered the relinquishment of Spain and the Indies, a barrier for the republic, and other advantages to England and Holland, on condition that the Two Sicilies and Milan should be ceded to Philip (Heinsius Correpondence, p. 93). The Dutch showed a favourable disposition, caring little for the interests of the emperor. The English ministers objected to terms which, as they urged, would make the French masters of Italy and the Mediterranean. All parties distrusted each other. The French held that Marlborough's ambition was the great obstacle to a peace of which the Dutch seem to have been sincerely desirous. Marlborough finally succeeded in persuading the Dutch to join in a document setting forth the terms to which the allies would adhere. A congress was held at the Hague, at which the foreign ministers were informed that no overtures for peace should be received without the concurrence of all the allies (Coxe, ii. 133; for these negotiations see the correspondence between Heinsius, Hop, and Marlborough, published at Amsterdam in 1850).

These difficulties had a bearing upon English party quarrels. The allies, jealous of each other, were also watching every movement of English sentiment. Unless Marlborough and Godolphin were supported at home, they could not expect to speak with authority abroad. Marlborough was always complaining with natural indignation of party spirit, while circumstances were forcing him to become the ally or the servant of a party. He held himself to be the servant of the crown on the old theory, and therefore held that the queen should be free to take men of all parties who would support her policy. But the great change was developing itself which made the