ministry really the servants of the House of Commons, and therefore of the dominant party in the house. The whigs had now a majority, and on the modern practice would have virtually appointed the cabinet. They wanted a share of the spoils, and were naturally jealous of ministers who might defeat or impede the vigorous prosecution of the war. But as the queen still sympathised with their opponents, and had never even heard of modern constitutional theories, they could only enforce their system by constant pressure, and frequently by factious threats. Their first aim was to secure a seat in the cabinet for Sunderland, and the duchess did her best to bully the queen into accepting him. Godolphin was anxious to obtain the support of the whigs, and threatened to resign if the queen did not yield. The whigs themselves threatened a withdrawal of their support of the ministry. Marlborough was entreated to interfere. He was alarmed by Godolnhin's desire to withdraw. He complained bitterly to the duchess of the want of confidence in him shown by the whigs. The queen piteously begged for a compromise. She resented the duchess's reproaches, and at last gave up answering her letters. Marlborough wrote to her in vain, pointing out the necessity of making concessions to the party upon which the war depended. Harley meanwhile tried to bring over the two great leaders to his own side, while protesting his fidelity to their interests. Marlborough began to doubt his sincerity. He returned to London 18 Nov. 1700, and at last persuaded the queen to yield. Sunderland was appointed secretary of state in the room of Sir Charles Hodges 3 Dec. 1706. Other changes were made in favour of the whigs, whose continued support was thus assured.
Parliament now entailed the honours of the duke with an annual pension of 5,000l. from the post-office upon his posterity by his daughters. The standards taken at Ramillies were solemnly deposited in the Guildhall of the city, and supplies were voted for the next campaign. Before opening military operations Marlborough had to meet a new danger. Charles XII of Sweden was now at the height of his career. He had dethroned Augustus in Poland, and, having entered Saxony victoriously, was encamped at Alt Ranstadt, near Leipzig. He had various grievances against the emperor, and was tempted to try the part of a new Gustavus Adolphus. Louis XIV endeavoured to turn him to account by asking him to become a mediator in the European quarrel. Marlborough had managed to obtain accounts of the various schemes under discussion, and resolved himself to visit the king. Leaving the Hague 28 April 1707, he passed through Hanover, and, after consulting the elector, went to the Swedish camp. He was introduced to the king 20 April, and showed himself as daring in diplomatic as in military manoeuvres by assuring Charles that he would like to serve some campaigns in the Swedish army, in order to perfect himself in the art of war (see Coxe, ii. 196). Ledyard, who was in Saxony at the time, gives some details as to these interviews, of which Voltaire has constructed a fanciful account (Ledyard, ii. 160-79). In one way or other he succeeded in soothing the king's irritability and persuading him that delicate questions, especially as to the rights of protestants, might be postponed till the peace. He also adopted a judicious hint of the elector of Hanover by promising annual pensions, the first year payable in advance, to Charles's ministers. He then visited the king of Prussia, when the frugal monarch surprised Marlborough by 'forcing upon him' a diamond ring worth 1,000l., and was back at the Hague 8 May 1707, having been eighteen days on his journey.
The crushing defeat at Almanza (25 April) made fresh efforts necessary in Spain. The Dutch seemed to care little for this part of the war, while the emperor had his own private views. His jealousy had been excited by the French overtures to Holland and England, and he determined to make sure of Naples. The Duke of Savoy hereupon insisted upon an equivalent in Lombardy, and Marlborough again had to make the necessary agreement. He then endeavoured to bring the emperor to consent to a combined attack upon Toulon. The emperor was resolved to secure Naples in the first place; he made a secret treaty with the French for neutrality in Italy; allowed their garrisons to withdraw from Milan and Mantua, and sent a detachment of nine thousand men under Daun (father of the Daun of the seven years' war) to occupy Naples. The French, thus relieved from pressure in Italy, could spare more forces for the Rhine and the Netherlands (Despatches, iii. 392). Marlborough was opposed by a superior force under Vendôme (ib. p. 393), and the weather was very unfavourable (ib. p. 529), although this does not appear to explain the remarkable inactivity of his campaign. His numerical inferiority was not great; nis troops were in good spirits, and he was himself anxious to take the offensive. Yet nothing happened of importance. The Dutch were inclined to be cautious, and their nervousness about the towns alreadv taken appears to have impeded Marlborough's motions (ib. p. 454; Private Correspondence, i. 78). The French
