War was that she crossed the path of England and Russia simultaneously. In concluding a peace, this mistake was not to be repeated; otherwise, the peace could never have been a real one. One would have had to content oneself with closing the doors of Russian aggression, separating Russia from France, and pacifying the West.
I never considered it possible to conquer England in such a manner that the British Empire would be forced upon her knees. If, however, we had achieved a victory on the continent and brought about a peace by agreement, it would have been possible to regain the German colonies and to effect a territorial exchange, which would have heightened the ability of these colonies to support themselves.
When I was in Berlin at the end of 1915 and during the summer of 1916, I touched upon these questions in conversation with Bethmann-Hollweg, and I noted with satisfaction that we were in agreement. The peace programme which had been sketched above was the maximum of that which we could demand in case of victory. I soon realized, however, that we would have to content ourselves with less than this maximum, and in 1916 I saw that if we could secure the status quo ante along the whole line, this would amount to complete success.
Our position was comparable with that of Frederick II, King of Prussia, during the seven years war, whose tremendous success consisted in the fact that the far more powerful coalition against him was unable
