to conquer him. We could have been more than content, if the enemy coalition had failed to bring about our downfall. A peace before the final decision was so much in our interests and in the interests of humanity that I would always have been prepared, in case of necessity, to make territorial sacrifices in order to secure peace.
I was one of the first who spoke the word "peace" in parliament on December 7, 1915, when Tisza replied that he agreed with everything that I had said, but that he bore me a grudge nevertheless for having said it. In my opinion, the main impediment in making peace before a final decision was reached lay in the fact that the Entente did not wish to conclude peace before they had achieved complete victory. Accordingly, for the benefit of the foreign public I expressed myself twice on this subject in the Revue Politique Internationale (Autumn, 1916, and Autumn, 1917). As the conviction which I held then is best expressed by these essays, and as the questions dealt with are still actual to-day, I quote the following from them:
"La prolongation de la guerre n'est qu'un crime contre l'humanité; les avantages, que l'on pourra retirer d'une victoire finale ne valent pas les sacrifices en vies humaines qu'elle exigerait."
I pointed out that the war need not be continued in order to reform international law, which was asserted to be the case by the Entente. I explained that we also were ready to accept such reforms, and, moreover: "le problème d'une paix durable trop compliqué pour
