regarded this expectation as dangerous and short-sighted. The Social Democrats were not sufficiently strong to enforce the peace. The general mobilization, the unusual power which was at the disposal of the Government, and the highly developed nationalistic and imperialistic feelings made it easy for the Government to counterbalance the efforts of the International so long as exhaustion and military catastrophe had not become established. In many places a considerable proportion of the Social Democratic workers joined the military party.
I considered the one-sided acceptance of the fundamental point of view which approved of a peace without annexation, completely mistaken, because this would have persuaded our opponents that, no matter how much they demanded from us, and no matter how long they continued this murderous war, and no matter how much they might be conquered, we would have tied ourselves in such a way that we could demand nothing either in money or in territory. It would have been nothing but a positive instigation to the military party to continue the war. In case of victory they could hope for everything from us; in case of defeat they were protected from the worst consequences of their own policy. We enhanced the value of the favourable conditions made by us before a final decision, by the continuation of [he war with the risk that this involved. It might have been right to offer to accept on a suitable occasion the status quo with an emphasis upon the fart that our demands would alter in accordance with the
