Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/185

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
178
DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR

situation; in fact, it might even have been advisable to bring territorial sacrifices in case of necessity, but anything binding should have been avoided on principle because it is impossible to depart from this policy without moral loss. A politician who accepts the socialistic and pacifist theory becomes a slave of his belief, and cannot, without heavy moral damage, become a politician in the opposite camp again. This was the weakness of Count Czernin, who cloaked himself with the mantle of pacificism and wanted to secure at the same time the possibility of exploiting practical political measures. This contradiction between words and action also became the heel of Achilles in the historic figure of Wilson. The appropriation of the battle-cry of the socialists assured to socialism such a power against which a defence could only have been led successfully if peace had not been brought about in spite of their efforts.

Ludendorff and Tirpitz describe in their memoirs the publication of this desire even after a peace by agreement, as a mistake. As—in their opinion—the enemy did not desire to reach an agreement but to achieve victory, only the readiness to fight, energy and endurance could have saved us.

This last assertion certainly corresponds with the truth; but it was a failure to analyse the psychology of modern nations, to assume that this tenacity and this endurance could be kept alive by promises and by imperialistic successes. As the defensive aim was the only justification of the war in the eyes of the masses, and since