of wheat that is untied. In the circumstances there could be no hope that the situation in the Balkans would improve; it would be certain, rather, that the situation would deteriorate.
Germany felt that the members of the Entente had not taken Serbia under their protection because they considered the demands of Serbia justified in themselves, but because Germany realised that the Entente regarded Austria as the outer bulwarks of the advancing might of Germany. The Entente only supported Serbia in opposition to us because they intended to cut off Germany from the Near East. If we had collapsed under this pressure, Germany would have had to surrender herself to the coalition whose aggressive aims were so strongly resented by public opinion in Germany. Germany sought refuge wherever vital interests attempted to solve the problem by wresting the double-edged sword from Jugo-Slavia. It was for this reason that von Tschirschky, the Ambassador, as he told me personally, tried to persuade us to take up an energetic attitude, and he let us feel for the same reason that Austria-Hungary would lose her value as an ally for Berlin if she failed to solve this question. And it was also for this reason that the Kaiser and his Chancellor were of the opinion that immediate military action was most advantageous (June 7).
During the first Cabinet meeting which considered the consequences of the murder, all the Hungarian and Austrian Ministers, with the exception of Tisza, demanded the war and considered that immediate
