action which would surprise Serbia was the only means to the desired end. It was only Tisza who prevented the realization of this conviction. He was ready to be content with a diplomatic victory which should be the starting-point for a more active policy that was to improve our position.
However, this attitude did not finally dictate the policy of the Monarchy. When the ultimatum was drafted, and during subsequent events, the intention of forcing Serbia to war became paramount. Serbia gained an opportunity of avoiding war by the action of Tisza, but our subsequent procedure appeared to have had the intention of making it difficult for Serbia to make use of this opportunity without serious humiliation.
The data in the new Red-book make it quite clear that Vienna considered war with Serbia as the best solution. At the same time, these data show that the European War was not desired in Austria. In fact, is it necessary to prove this? Is it not obvious that the old Monarchy and its old ruler did not want a European war? Does not the fact that we took the initiative prove that we were concerned with more modest aims than the World War? Not a single Minister, be he German, Austrian or Hungarian, spoke of the necessity of seizing the opportunity to defeat Russia or the Entente, or of deciding once and for all the position between the two world alliances by force of arms. The World War was only spoken of as a possibility, which had to be risked only as it was
