Page:Dobbs public report.pdf/21

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

opinion was inadvertently or negligently disclosed – for example, by being left in a public space either inside or outside the building.

Assuming, however, that the opinion was intentionally provided to Politico by a Court employee, that individual was evidently able to act without being detected by any of the Court’s IT systems. If it was a Court employee, or someone who had access to an employee’s home, that person was able to act with impunity because of inadequate security with respect to the movement of hard copy documents from the Court to home, the absence of mechanisms to track print jobs on Court printers and copiers, and other gaps in security or policies.

The investigative team made general findings and recommendations for restricting and managing access to Court-sensitive materials, improving training, and improving IT capabilities. They are listed below. More detailed recommendations are included in Annex A, which, as previously noted, will not be made public. Many of these are underway and will be completed as soon as practicable.

1. Too many personnel have access to certain Court-sensitive documents. The current distribution mechanisms result in too many people having access to highly sensitive information and the inability to actively track who is handling and accessing these documents. Distribution should be more

18