long struggle. Krauss accepted failure for the moment, hoping for an early spring offensive farther west. Five days later the snow came, the heavy winter fall that was at least a month late.
The Austrians and Germans were much favoured by the late coming of winter, which greatly prolonged the strain on the hard-tried armies of Italy. But it gave also to the defending troops the chance to re-make at once a shaken reputation.
The recovery of the Italian army on Monte Grappa and the Piave, after the initial failures and the heart-breaking experiences of the long retreat, was a remarkable feat of courage and will. It will be clear from the narrative here given that the Caporetto disaster was not due solely to the cause which was at first generally accepted as the explanation of a defeat so sudden and so overwhelming. Cadorna's communique of Oct. 28, which condemned in the strongest terms the behaviour of " detachments of the II. Army " and gave this as the cause of the enemy success, was too simple an explanation, and was, moreover, unwise. Inevitably, the impression was left that the failure in moral had been more widespread than was actually the case. For in the whole course of the war no such candid announcement had ever been made by any commander on either side; it was assumed, especially abroad, that if Cadorna confessed this much there was far more that he did not tell. Cadorna wished to arouse both army and country to a sense of the situation, and to indicate clearly the results of the peace propaganda against which he had protested. In Italy the result was good on the whole, for the country was stung to a great effort. But Cadorna's open condemnation of his soldiers was strongly resented in many quarters.
There is no question about the weak resistance of certain units in line, nor can it be denied that other troops, .among the reserves, became temporarily infected with a spirit that led to what many observers likened to a strike. Extreme war-weariness and socialist propaganda had their offspring in these failures. But the failures were sporadic only. The stories current at the time and long after, of a preconcerted agreement for surrender to the enemy, have no foundation whatever. The defending troops were subjected to a very severe trial and some of them failed. Their failure led to disaster. How far might disaster have been lessened or averted if the preparations for the Austro-German attack, and the actual conduct of the defence, had been different?
The narrative has drawn attention to certain errors and misunderstandings which contributed to the enemy success. First among these, in order of time, was the difference of opinion between Cadorna and Capello as to the right course to pursue in face of the coming attack. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Capello was only half-hearted in adopting, and in directing his corps commanders to adopt, the line of action indicated by his chief. Whether Cadorna or Capello was right in idea is a question which will remain a subject of contention, though Cadorna's arguments seem almost unanswerable. The point is that Capello would seem to have interpreted Cadorna's instructions as to counter-offensive action in too liberal a fashion, influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by his own wish to attempt a big counter-stroke. The fact remains that the bulk of the II. Army was still aligned for an offensive, and though a complete modification was impossible, certain changes might have been made. The situation of the IV. Corps was especially unfavourable for defence, the front-line positions of the 46th Div. being practically untenable. The Sleme-Mrzli position ought to have been abandoned for the Pleca-Selisce line, which was as strong naturally as the other was weak. Despite the weakness of the Sleme-Mrzli line, both dominated and enfiladed, despite the practical certainty that it could not be maintained against a resolute offensive in force, the enemy attack found a large num- ber of Italian guns, including many of medium calibre, stationed well in advance of the Pleca-Selisce line. Although various commanders had reported the Sleme-Mrzli line indefensible, steps which should have followed logically had not been taken.
It is obvious also—after the event—that if the reserves for the IV. Corps had been close at hand, on the Stol and higher up the Natisone valley, the inrush of the enemy might have been stemmed. Such dispositions were clearly desirable, even before the event. There was, in fact, a tendency to underestimate the amount of time necessary for the transference of troops from one position to another. On the other hand, Cavaciocchi did not make the best use of the reserves which he had. Cadorna's efforts had not succeeded in making all of his subordinates grasp the principles of defence in depth, or of “elastic” defence. It was only later that the theories upon which he had for long insisted were understood and applied. And it may be admitted that the tendency to push the infantry too far forward was a necessary consequence of the policy which had left the guns aligned as for an offensive. The failure to hold in strength the roads on both sides of the Isonzo has never been satisfactorily explained. All that can be said is that an attack along these roads was apparently unexpected; that it came; and that it had much to do with the disaster that followed. It is clear that there was insufficient collaboration between the commanders of the three corps occupying the front attacked. This was doubtless due to the extreme pressure of the days which preceded the offensive, and to the many modifications which had to be made during these days. But it remains a grave omission.
The failure of the Italian artillery to carry out the general order of counter-preparation expressly given by Cadorna, and repeated in no less categorical terms by Capello, had an undoubted effect upon the course of the battle. The attacking troops, both gunners and infantry, found their task unexpectedly lightened by the absence of a heavy return fire upon their batteries, trenches, and zones of concentration. The Italian infantry, waiting under a crushing bombardment, were puzzled and disheartened by the silence of their own guns. This holding of the Italian fire, like the failure to appreciate the necessity for defence in depth, is explained by the fact that as regards the practice of defensive tactics the Italians were some two years in arrears. Cadorna and a few others had realized the progress made in attack methods and the necessity of meeting them with new methods of defence. The realization had not spread down- ward. The Italian armies on the Julian front had been so busily occupied in attack that they had not worked out the application of new defensive methods. They had had no recent practice in meeting an attack on the grand scale. It was this lack of practice, no doubt, and a false confidence based on obsolete experience, which led to the belief that even if the opening phases of the battle were unfavourable to the defence, there would be ample time to restore the situation. This spirit was widely evident in the disposition of troops and guns.
When retreat became inevitable, the prospects might well have seemed desperate to those who had to organize it. For the army, long used to the war of positions that had been the rule for 28 months, was in no condition to move. The retreat, with all its confusion, its mistakes and its tragedies, remains an astonishing achievement. The resistance which followed it, when the retiring armies turned and stood at bay on the mountains and on the Piave, was the greatest of Italian victories. (W. K. McC.)
CAPPS, EDWARD (1866—), American classical scholar, was born at Jacksonville, Ill., Dec. 21 1866. He was educated at Illinois College (A.B. 1887) and Yale (Ph.D. 1891). In 1890 he was appointed tutor at Yale. In 1892 he joined the faculty of the newly-founded university of Chicago as professor of Greek language and literature, remaining such until 1907. In 1903 he was special lecturer at Harvard, and during the next two years studied at Athens and Halle. During 1906–7 he was managing editor of Classical Philology, in 1907 was elected president of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South, and the same year was called to Princeton as professor of classics. In 1914 he was elected president of the American Philological Association, and in 1917 was Turnbull lecturer on poetry at Johns Hopkins. In 1918 he was appointed head of the American Red Cross commission to Greece with the rank of colonel. In 1920 he was appointed minister to Greece, resigning in March 1921 and returning to Princeton. A leading authority on the Greek theatre, he contributed much to philological journals.
His works include The Stage in the Greek Theatre (1891); From Homer to Theocritus (1901); The Introduction of Comedy into the
