Brigade was attacked with great violence; on account of the ex-
tent of its front it had no reserves and was compelled to retreat
at 9 A.M. on the bridges of Vailly and Chavonne and to consoli-
date S. of the Aisne. On Nov. i the German patrols, which had
pushed forward on the left bank, were driven off. On Nov. 2,
however, at 8 A.M., after a violent bombardment the i38th
Brigade was attacked in its turn and ceded one to two km. of
ground, stopping the enemy advance in front of Soupir and
Moussy. The 6gth Reserve Div. suffered heavy losses: 78 offi-
cers and 3,800 men. This division was relieved by the I. Deligny
Corps, which, during Nov. 6-12, failed to retake the lost ground.
The Engagement of Crouy. On the heights of Soissons-Missy- sur-Aisne the French position was rushed forward too far to the N. of the Aisne. The sth group of reserve divisions, which occu- pied this position, had even been compelled to leave the greater part of its artillery on the south bank, whence it was unable to support the infantry effectively. Fearing a repetition of the defeat suffered at Vailly by the 6gth Reserve Div., Gen. Mau- noury, commanding the VI. Army, decided to improve his position a position which only hung on to the edges of the plateau which overlooked the Aisne. On his instructions Gen. Berthelot, who had just taken over command of the sth group of reserve divisions, on Dec. 7, worked out a plan of attack on the Plateau 132, which dominates Crouy, with the object of debouching later on towards Terny with his left, then towards Pont Rouge with his right.
The attack on Hill 132 was launched on Jan. 8 1915 at 8:45 A.M., after a bombardment which lasted an hour and a-half. It was supported by artillery of various calibre, in which slow-firing guns of old type preponderated: 60 guns of 75 mm., 24 of 95 mm., 4 of 105 mm., 8 of 120 mm., loof 155 mm. (short), 4 of 155 mm. (long). This concentration represented a great effort at that period of the war, but it was insufficient, more especially as the French attack ended in a German attack, and the battle extended over a front of 10 km. Out of six breaches which the engi- neers were to have made in the wire with battens filled with pe- tards four only were passable, but the others were opened by the ' attackers themselves. The four attacking battalions, drawn up in ten columns, seized the German trenches in a few minutes without great loss. All the German counter-attacks, preceded by violent bombardments, were repulsed during the two days of Jan. 8 and 9. On the loth the French attack made further prog- ress, but on the nth the Germans succeeded in regaining a footing to the N. of Crouy.
On the night of Jan. 11-12 a flood on the Aisne swept away all the bridges at Villeneuve and at Soissons, except the " bridge of the English " at Soissons, so named because it had been con- structed by the British army after the battle of the Marne. This unforeseen occurrence greatly hindered the sending-up of reinforcements and rations. The Germans had received con- siderable reinforcements in infantry and artillery. On Jan. 12, after a violent cannonade, they attacked Hill 132 and retook all the ground gained during the preceding days. Gen. Maunoury put at Gen. Berthelot 's disposal the whole of the i4th Clae's Div., one brigade of which was commanded by Gen. Nivelle. He wished to hold fast on his right with the 55th Div. and the com- posite Klein brigade whilst the I4th Div. should attack on the left towards Terny. But on the i3th his right was strongly attacked in the direction of Montal and Ste. Marguerite; these troops were very exhausted after six days of hard fighting with- out rest, day or night. Moreover, the i4th Div. had only made very small progress. The German artillery with direct observa- tion could fire at effective range on the bridge at Soissons and disaster might follow its destruction. In these circumstances to leave French troops on the right bank of the Aisne was no more than a useless act of imprudence, and Gen. Maunoury gave them the order to retreat to the left bank. That retreat was carried out in good order during the night of Jan. 13-14, without being disturbed by the enemy. The losses totalled 161 officers and 12,250 men killed, wounded or missing.
On Jan. 25-26, after a very violent bombardment, which extended over several kilometres of front, the XVIII. French
Corps attempted a local attack, which, in consequence of the collapse of a dug-out which buried several hundred men, lost the crest of Hurtebise on the Chemin des Dames. Then the positions became fixed on this part of the front until the French offensive of April 16 1917. (C. M. E. M.)
II. THE WINTER BATTLE or 1914-5
The part of Champagne in which the winter fighting of 1914 took place consists of a vast, gently undulating plain between two ridges of hills and plateaus which form its northern and southern boundaries. The greater part of its surface is formed of white chalk covered by a crust of arable soil, often very thin and in some places non-existent. This chalky plain is in its southern part known as " dusty " Champagne, and in its northern part as upper Champagne. To the E. of it lies the hilly upland country bordering the Argonne, a clayey, broken district, covered with woods and well watered. Towards the N. the central plain is broken up by a series of small isolated hills, the principal of which are the hills of Brimont (170 metres), Berru and Nogent 1'Abbesse to the N. and E. of Reims and that of Moronvilliers (260 metres) further to the E. To the E. the Champagne plain rises in like manner to the hilly zone of Remois and Tardenois. Ever since the beginning of the igth century attempts had been made to improve this impoverished land by planting pines in geometrically formed clumps, which form a prominent feature of the landscape. After some 25 to 30 years at least the pine needles decompose into a kind of crust, and it is thus possible to cultivate with some prospect of success. To the N. of the Marne the Champagne plain is traversed by several streams; the Vesle running north-westwards from Somme- Vesle to the E. of Cha- lons; the Suippe practically parallel to it running from Somme- Suippe to the Aisne near Conde en Suippe; the Tourbe flowing in the opposite direction and N.E. of Somme-Tourbe towards the Aisne at Servon; and the Dormois passing by Ripont, Rouv- roy and Cernay en Dormois in the same direction. The Py and the Alin flow respectively to the W. and to the N.E. between Breer, the Aisne and St. Martin 1'Heureuxon the Suippe. Several old Roman roads cross this region, notably those from Chalons to Rethel by way of Souain and Somme-Py from St. Menehould to Vouziers along the valley of the Aisne, all running in a general direction from S. to N. They are crossed by the road from Reims to St. Menehould, which runs at the foot of the heights of Moronvilliers, Nogent 1'Abbesse, and thence by St. Hilaire le Grand, Jonchery, Suippes and Somme-Tourbe. Villages are rare and of little importance ; Souain, Perthes les Hurlus, Hurlus, Le Mesnil les Hurlus, Tahure and Massiges are all poor and ill- constructed hamlets scattered over the vast plain.
The winter battle began at the end of 1914. After the battle of the Marne the pursuit initiated by the Allied armies was checked after a few days, principally owing to a shortage of artillery ammunition, and the opposing forces took up position and set to work to construct extensive lines of entrenchments of a kind that had not been seen since the i8th century. South of the Aisne the German front swung round to the E. of Reims, included the hills of Nogent 1'Abbesse and the forts commanding them, and ran thence along the Roman road S. of the Moron- villiers heights, crossing the Suippe above Auberive and passing S. of Souain, Perthes and Massiges and N. of Ville sur Tourbe to the Aisne. The choice of this line was not dictated by either strategical or tactical reasons. The two adversaries installed themselves in face of each other by means of a series of succes- sive engagements, the German object being to maintain an unbroken front as close as possible to Verdun and Reims.
The French Higher Command considered that, despite the munitions crisis, the offensive must be resumed. The moral of the troops might well suffer from the wearisome hardships in- separable from trench warfare, for a kind of Siege of Sebastopol on a large scale appeared ill-suited to the temperament of the French soldier. Moreover, the " home front " had also to be considered; and finally it was necessary to do something to di- vert the enemy's attention from the Russian front. The British had opened their offensive sooner than the Germans had be-
