Alsace and the Rhine lands being committed to 13, of which two were allocated to the fortresses. The leitmotiv of extreme density on the right occurs in all Schlieffen's drafts and schemes. " Macht mir nur den rechten Fliigel stark " were his half-conscious dying words. In a second scheme, based on the two-front war, which provided for a defence force in East Prussia approximately equal to that which von Moltke actually placed there in 1914, the total force was lessened to that extent, but the ratio of about seven divisions N.W. of Thionville to one S.E. of that pivot was maintained.
When von Moltke, the younger, succeeded Schlieffen, the above plans were gradually blunted, first because the idea of making the active army a simple kernel for soldiers of all cate- gories was accepted only in part, and secondly because the grow- ing war-readiness of the French army, the fever of offensive spirit that had obviously seized it, and after 1013 its very high peace-strength, made it increasingly likely that the French would open the war with a determined offensive into Lorraine and the Rhine lands. In these circumstances so drastic a deple- tion of the forces to the left of Metz as that contemplated by Schlieffen did not commend itself to Moltke, who found a com- promise in allocating one-quarter of the whole available force, instead of one-eighth, to the defensive (or defensive-offensive) front, and holding large quantities of empty rolling-stock on the Rhine in readiness to transfer a proportion of this quarter to the right wing as soon as circumstances should allow this to be done. The amplitude of the swing was, however, undeniably dimin- ished thereby.
In one point, Schlieffen and Moltke were agreed the neces- sity of pushing out beyond the line of the Belgian Meuse. In both schemes therefore the quick seizure of Liege and a deploy- ment foreground beyond that fortress figured as an indispensable preliminary to the operations proper.
The German plan, to which effect was given in August 1914, provided as follows: (a) A protective system was formed all along the line, consisting, not as had been expected of complete formations, but of single brigades of infantry (with a proportion of other arms), brought up from their peace stations without waiting to receive and equip their reservists. These brigades took over from the local troops the positions of the line that their respective army corps were to occupy, and their reservists rejoined by parties, (b) There was a concentration of the re- mainder of each corps, after mobilization in the usual way, be- hind its own representatives in the protective system. This concentration of the active corps was completed by the I4th day of mobilization (Aug. 15). (c) Concentration of reserve corps, as a rule immediately behind or to a flank of the corresponding active corps, was completed by the i6th day (Aug. 17). (d) Concentration of other formations, Ersatz divisions and mixed Landwehr brigades, was completed from the nth to the I7th day. (e) The six advanced, peace-strength brigades of the corps intended to assemble about Aachen were employed as a striking force under General von Emmich, which without waiting for siege artillery was to attempt to storm Liege at once, if the Bel- gians did not agree to let the Germans pass. The German ulti- matum to Belgium was handed in late on the evening of Aug. 2 (ist day of mobilization), and required an answer within twelve hours. There is reason to believe that, on Belgium's refusal, a proposal was made to Holland to allow the use of the Maestricht tongue as a gateway into the Belgian plain, but, whether this be so or not, it was only on the evening of the 3rd day of mobiliza- tion that the striking force crossed the frontier.
The order of battle, and allocation of the German forces N. of the pivot, was as follows: I. Army (General-Oberst von Kluck), five corps, assembled behind the Maestricht tongue (Jiilich- Krefeld area); II. Army (General-Oberst von Billow), seven corps, including one attached from I. Army, assembled facing the Liege frontier (Aachen-Malmedy-Euskirchen) ; III. Army (General-Oberst von Hausen), four corps, assembled in the area St. Vith-Wittlich-Bittburg; IV. Army (Duke Albrecht of Wiirt- temberg), five corps, assembled in the area Luxemburg (seized Aug. 2)-Trier-Diekirch-Wadern; V. 'Army (Wilhelm, German
Crown Prince), five corps, assembled in the area Metz-Thion- ville-Saarbrucken.
Thus twenty-six active and reserve corps (52 divisions) with a number of Landwehr brigades to follow were allocated to the five armies of the moving wing, of which nearly half were to cross the Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier as soon as the way was clear. The remainder were to traverse the Ardennes from E. to W. in echelon from the right (III. Army) and to pre- pare to wheel gradually S.W. in proportion to the progress of the
I. and II. Armies on the other side of the Meuse.
The 2nd Cavalry Command was of three divisions in front of the I. and II. Armies; the ist Cavalry Command of three divi- sions in front of the III.; the 4th Cavalry Command of two divi- sions in front of the IV. They were individually responsible to the Supreme Command, except when from time to time placed at the disposal of certain armies. Similarly, the armies were in principle directly subordinate to the Kaiser's headquarters, i.e. to General-Oberst von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, unless i temporarily paired, as was the case at the outset, with the I. and
II. Armies, of which Billow was in general charge.
The organization of the forces E. and S.E. of Metz was some- what different. Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, was ap- j pointed not only Chief of the VI. Army, but " Commandcr-in- Chief in the Rhine lands," a title with wider implications than that of an army commander, and his task included the pro- j tection of the left flank of " the Army " or " the main forces." | He had under him his own VI. Army (five corps, of which four i were Bavarian), the VII. Army of General-Oberst von Hccrin- | gen (three corps) and the 3rd Cavalry Command (three divi- | sions), in addition to the war garrisons of Metz, Strassburg, and , the upper Rhine defences (Neu Breisach, Istein). These 16 I active and reserve divisions were to be supplemented a few days j later by 6 Ersatz divisions, and mixed Landwehr brigades, , which were grouped in some cases in "Landwehr Commands." |
In all, the formations assigned to the western theatre of war comprised 68 active and reserve divisions, 6^ Ersatz divisions, 17^ Landwehr brigades and 10 cavalry divisions.
The First Operations of the Germans. The first operations to be carried out were: (i) The seizure of Liege and of as large a foreground as possible beyond; (2) the securing of the left flank of " the Army," and the attraction of as many French divisions as possible to Lorraine and Alsace, by the living and passive j forces under Prince Rupprecht. Both these essentials having been provided for, the five armies (I.-V.) were to proceed at once to the main task, which was to be a great " wheel through Belgium into France, pivoting on Thionville-Metz," in which wheel the II. and I. Armies were to govern the pace. The II. i Army was to swing on the arc Liege-Wavre, the I. following in echelon on the arc Tongres-Brussels, flankguarding towards \ Antwerp, whither, it was presumed, the Belgian field army would retire. No very distant objectives were fixed. When Liege and the region W. of the Meuse had been occupied, and i the cavalry divisions of the I. Cavalry Command had fixed the situation of the Belgian army, of the British forces expected to land at Ostend, and of the French forces which might be pushed i into Belgium from the S., specific orders could be given. Mean- 1 while, the problem was to deploy the two highly condensed armies ; of Kluck and Billow on the W. side of the Meuse, in spite of Liege and of the Belgian field army. On this, as the I. and II. Armies were to give the time to the rest, the whole movement depended; but while the III., IV. and V. Armies awaited devel- ' opments, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Commands were to push through the Ardennes and towards Damvillers, in order to clear up the situation in the Meuse valley from Namur to St. Mi- j hiel a mission which naturally brought about a series of conflicts with the French cavalry, and, above Stenay, with the ; French protective infantry system in the Woevre. In point of information, this cavalry activity probably yielded only con- 1 firmations of the obvious, but it was invaluable in veiling the \ .army movements when later these were begun.
The Liege operation is described under LIGE. There was no surprise, Belgiurn having mobilized her available forces at an early
