date in the European crisis; and five out of six brigade attacks on the night of Aug. 5-6 failed. One, however, penetrated into Liege, and for some days neither the German nor the Belgian, British or French Commands seem to have been able to form a clear view of the situation, as the fort-ring held out. Reconnoitring patrols of the German 2nd Cavalry Command, which passed the Meuse near the Dutch frontier simultaneously with parts of the attacking force, learned nothing of the Belgian dispositions, and the main body remained near its bridge. On Aug. 8 the situation at Liege was clear enough to enable the cavalry to push westward, and in the days following it established the front of the Belgian field army as lying approximately on the Geete line from S. of Jodoigne to Diest. But on Aug. 12, the attempt of the Germans to work round to the left of this position was checked in a severe local action at Haelen. The Liege forts, meantime, had to be reduced by super-heavy siege artillery, one by one, and it was not till Aug. 15 that the masses of the German I. and II. armies were able to begin to cross into the area comprised between Liege and the Geete. The resistance of the Liege forts had put back the start of the great wheeling movement for four days.
Thus the difficult and essential preliminary operation of seizing a bridgehead beyond the Meuse did not pass off quite according to programme. It had_ often, been alleged that the Germans had obtained a long start in their concentration by means of surreptitious mobilization. That this was not actually the case has been shown by a study published in 1920 by the Belgian General Staff ; but even had 'such a mobilization taken place, it would not have helped to solve the problem of Liege. All that infantry could contribute to its solution, the first six peace-strength brigades contributed. The rest was a matter of siege artillery, and it must be regarded as a seri- ous flaw in Moltke's plans that this artillery did not put in an ap- pearance on Aug. 6 instead of on Aug. 10.
On the other flank, the operations in Lorraine and Alsace, which were to maintain the ",pivot" of the wheel against French attack proceeded more favourably than had been anticipated too favour- ably, as the sequel was to show. The problem was difficult, and a priori reasoning could not assist its solution materially. For here, much more than on the Belgian flank, events depended upon the independent will of a great enemy army which was equally capable of the offensive or of the defensive-offensive; and although the tendency of French military thought in the last years before the war had evidently been towards the former, it was not clear how far this tendency had actually gone. Prince Rupprccht's task included not only the maintenance of the Metz Thionville pivot but the attraction of as large a force of the French as possible; and if their old policy of defensive-offensive still held good, then, in order to set up this attraction, he must attack. If not, although attack would not be necessary, a much larger proportion of the total force than that which Schlieffen had thought sufficient would have to be allotted to the front E. of Metz. For Schlieffen had reckoned with certainty on a defensive-offensive policy in his opponents, and had argued therefrom that no deep inroad of large forces into the Rhine lands would in fact be attempted by the French, when a tidal wave of seventy to a hundred German divisions was advancing through northeastern France. But the situation was quite different if the French offensive in full force was to be launched at the outset, while the tide in the N. was still dammed up. For these reasons, Prince Rupprecht was given about one-quarter of the total available forces, and instructed: (a) to take the offensive over the Lorraine frontier in order to draw upon himself as much as possible of the enemy's forces, in the 'event of these being handled according to the old policy; (6) to prepare a great defensive system, Metz-Lower Nied- Saar-Vosges-Strassburg, against the contingency of an immediate powerful offensive of the French ; (c) in the latter event, to suspend the offensive initiated in accordance with (a), and to draw back from line to line till the Saar was reached, where a standing defence would be made in conjunction with counter-attack on the French left from the Metz-Nied system. In the least likely alternative of only minor forces of the French being met with in Lorraine, Prince Rupprecht might utilize the Metz system to cover the transfer of part of his forces W. of the Moselle for co5peration with the V. Army. Upper Alsace was to be held against light forces, but evacu- ated step by step if seriously invaded. The VI. Army with the 3rd Cavalry Command was assembled accordingly in Lorraine, the VII. Army (minus two expected Italian cavalry divisions) in Alsace; and mobilized and civil labour on a large scale was employed in creating the " Nied " position, which ran from where the newest Metz works touched that river to its mouth N.W. of Saarouis. The French I. and II. Armies, ready for operations as soon as the Germans, spared the latter the necessity of testing their intentions by advancing on Aug. 14 in great force. Accordingly, the German VI. Army drew back from position to position, while the VII. Army, which had defeated the first inroad of the French VII. Corps at Mulhausen, likewise drew back gradually before the army of Pau, dispatching part of its forces by Zabern to the upper Saar to assist the VI. Army's defence, and preparing with the remainder to hold the line Schirmeck-Molsheim-Strassburg firmly. But this withdrawal, after making all preparations for the offensive in the first place, was only unwillingly and half-heartedly carried out by Rupprecht's headquarters. And when, on Aug. 17, news arrived from Moltke
that the French advance into Lorraine was, after all, not their main offensive, Rupprecht determined to fight on the line of his rear-guards on Aug. 20. Thus, just at the moment when the French had decided to push their offensive without further hesitation, the Germans changed their policy into one of flank attack. The battles of Mor- hange (Morchingen) and Saarburg followed (see FRONTIERS, BATTLES OF THE: section Lorraine), in which the Germans were victorious. A hot pursuit was initiated, and with that disappeared for the time being all possibility of drawing off any part of Prince Rupprecht's forces for the benefit of the " Army." Moltke's rolling-stock on the Rhine waited in vain. The Commander-in-Chief in the Rhine lands had brilliantly performed both his tasks, but he had become a commander of two ardent armies who could see only the enemy in front of him.
The German Advance through Belgium and France. Once the Liege foreground had been secured, and the pivot of Thionville- Metz been made firm, there was no need, in Schlieffen's opinion, for overhaste in the development of the main operation, which required principally power. Moltke, on the other hand, sought to remedy the reduction of power on the striking wing by urging it to speed. This was not easy, for the administrative and tech- nical marching arrangements required for drawing the five or six corps of the I. Army through the narrow tunnel between Liege and the Dutch frontier were complicated, while Billow's II. Army displayed no great energy in crossing the Meuse above Liege. Thus the Belgian main army was left undisturbed on the Geete the most forward position which it could safely adopt in view of the risk of being outflanked by a German movement through Dutch territory till Aug. 19, when, threatened with severance from Antwerp, it began to retire westward with but little fighting. Even then, however, the task of, the German I. Army was by no means clear. The possible arrival of a British Expeditionary Force on its outer flank was a standing menace, and until the true right flank of the system, Billow's II. Army, had begun its advance in earnest its protective echelon (I. Army) could not operate to any purpose. On the evening of Aug. 19 the 1 8th day of mobilization the outer flank of the wheel had only reached the line Thildonck-Tirlemont (I. Army)-Sart Rib- sart-Mehaigne (II. Army), while the armies traversing the Ardennes were at Marche (III.) and Bastogne-Arlon (IV.) respectively. The V. Army was just beginning to draw out of the Thionville area towards Longwy. On Aug. 20, learning that a large French army had been assembled in the Charleroi region, Billow prepared its encirclement by beginning to wheel-in not only the II. Army's right wing but the I. Army (then under his orders) as well; but as the cooperation of the III. Army moving on Dinant was intended, that army, as well as the I., had to be given time, and the concentric blow upon Lanrezac was fixed for Aug. 23, while the left wing of the II. Army was to attack Namur from both banks of the Meuse. Had these measures been carried out, the " vast wheeling movement" would, on the 22nd day of mobilization, have occupied the line Nivelles-Charleroi-Dinant- Neufchateau-Arlon-Thionville instead of the line Ghent-E. front of Maubeuge-Sedan-Thionville, as Schlieffen had planned for that day. But the fact of being a few days in arrear was of small importance relatively to the fact that, instead of contin- uing to swing out, the German line would be beginning already to roll in. The essential principle of the movement, that of out- flanking not only the momentary position, but also any and every position of the enemy's left wing, was sacrificed. The British Expeditionary Force, unlocated. lay outside instead of inside the scope of the wheel.
But during Aug. 20-23 events crowded upon one another at almost every point of the German line. The left wing of the II. Army stormed Namur, with the powerful aid of the super-heavy artillery (this time deployed from the outset), while the right became engaged front-to-front with Lanrezac (see FRONTIERS, BATTLES OF THE: section Charleroi). The I. Army, advancing in echelon to the battlefield indicated by Billow, but seeking still to preserve both its rearward echelonment and its power of extending outwards, came into contact, with its left wing, with the British Expeditionary Force in the neighbourhood of Mons (see FRONTIERS, BATTLES OF THE: section Mons). Meanwhile, the German III. Army, drawing out of the W.S.W. direction in order to cooperate in the battle proposed for Aug. 23, had lost
