1921 REVIEWS OF BOOKS 281 should she fall in with the Russian schemes ; but, while the policy of Stanhope, warmly seconded by France, had steadily been directed towards gaining over Prussia to the Quadruple Alliance, and Prussia, with an eye to Stettin, had at one time shown an inclination towards such a solution, Bernstorff and the Hanoverian interest would have nothing to say to a Prussian alliance, and what is more, put very little trust in the existing French. The Austrian government now demanded that George I should, as king of Great Britain, enter into the triple alliance on behalf of Poland (and the empire), and support it by means of a sufficient fleet. But — and here was the essence of the problem — how could the emperor and his allies be assured of the co-operation, more especially for the protection of the ports of Danzig and Elbing, of the British fleet, if the ministry, or in other words the British parliament, remained without cognizance of the transaction and of the king's undertaking ? How, indeed, unless by means of political mystification which to this day remains not wholly cleared up ? On 5 January 1719 the treaty, purely defensive in character, which bound the emperor and the two electors to the mutual protection of their territories, in case of attack, was duly signed at Vienna by their plenipotentiaries, St. Saphorin representing the elector of Hanover; and the integrity of the Polish state was thus preserved — preserved, as Dr. Michael is not afraid of putting it, for half a century. The public articles or provisions were accompanied by certain secret articles and mutual declarations as to the processes involved in the alliance ; and among these was a declaration, signed by St. Saphorin, as to the protection to be afforded by a British fleet in the event of an attack upon Danzig and Elbing. But it was not possible that such a document could be sent to King George for signature, with the treaty for ratification, without receiving the countersignature of a British minister. George I was personally prepared to accept and sign ; but the constitutional difficulty was unsurmountable ; and as it stood, the declaration could not be countersigned by any British minister. Bernstorff 's expedient of sending with the treaty a copy of the declaration, but dropping the phrase stating that the promise of sending the fleet was given ad sustinendam tractatus praesentis executionem, might cast some dust in the eyes of the British ministry ; but the declaration itself remained. As it happened (after an attempt devised by Le Cocq, the Polish minister at the court of St. James's, and formulated by St. Saphorin, to treat the promise of protection to Danzig and Elbing, being places of importance to British trade, as a matter wholly unconnected with the treaty), the treaty itself, which had been concluded and ratified without the declaration in question, proved to have fulfilled its immediate purpose, and the Tsar Peter, though breathing fire and fury, withdrew his troops from Poland, and neither the declaration nor an equivalent of it came into play. St. Saphorin was let off with a lecture by the king-elector, and by another from Bernstorff, who pointed out that, as had been shown by earlier examples of using fleets without a previous declaration of war, it was in such a case easier to do things than to discuss them beforehand. But the obnoxious declaration never found its way out of King George's German chancery, where — in the archives of Hanover — it reposes at the present day.
