282 REVIEWS OF BOOKS April When, like vol. i of this History, part i of vol. ii reaches a second edition, a few misprints might be removed from a generally most correct text. The Duchess of ' Albans ' (p. 53) and ' Lord Finch ' (p. 555) should be ' the Duchess of St. Albans ' and ' Mr. Finch '. The ' power of the Stool ' (p. 561) is surely intended for ' the power of the State ' ? Is ' the Dissenter ' (passim) an orthodox German plural ? And, to add a slight historical slip, the university of Cambridge in 1717 can hardly be described as a 'citadel of Toryism' (p. 51). A. W. Ward. The Navy in the War of 17 39-17 48. By Rear-Admiral H. W. Richmond. 3 vols. (Cambridge: University Press, 1920.) Of all our naval wars, that of the years 1739-48 has been least studied. Few documents concerning it have been published, and in Sir W. Laird Clowes's Royal Navy the account of those nine years fills only eighty- seven pages. Rear-Admiral Richmond has therefore rendered excellent service by describing the war in a narrative which is detailed, clear, fully annotated, and based on an examination of all available documents. The author has, since the year 1907, investigated all available sources ; he explains the causes of the war, then traces its expansion owing to the disputes arising out of the Austrian succession, and examines the con- sequences of the rapid development of a trade war into a world-wide conflict. The strategic problems were also complicated up to the spring of 1744 by the malevolent neutrality of France, which served to clog British naval operations. These would have been in any case ineffective, for the first lord, Sir Charles Wager, failed to infuse sufficient wisdom or energy into Walpole and Newcastle. But the constant threats of hostile action by the Brest and Toulon fleets would have taxed the resourcefulness of a Pitt or a Middleton. The opening chapters would have gained in value if the author had discussed the advantages of compelling France to declare herself. However critical was the situation on the Continent after the death of the emperor, the British navy was almost completely hampered by a neutrality which long imposed on it nearly all the responsibilities of actual warfare, while depriving it of the power to strike. Probably the recollections of 1740-4 nerved Pitt in 1761 with the resolve to end Spanish neutrality. If he had been in power in the summer of 1740 he would almost certainly have answered by war the menacing dispatch of the Brest and Toulon fleets to the West Indies. Indirectly, as Rear-Admiral Richmond shows, the uncertainties of the situation in home waters occasioned the delay in the sending of reinforcements to Admiral Vernon for the projected attack on Cartagena, a delay which entailed disastrous losses by disease. The evidence now forthcoming warrants the conclusion that military writers have laid too much stress on Vernon's browbeating of General Wentworth respecting the land operations. Wentworth's delays were highly culpable, and the risk to Vernon's fleet of being caught in a trap by the Spanish fleet (perhaps also by that of France) amply justified energetic representations. Vernon was also aware that delay spelt pestilence. Altogether the opening of hostilities, apart from Vernon's dash on Portobello, could scarcely have ,ve
