Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/10

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CONTENTS.
30. Return. Philosophy deals with necessary truths—therefore retarded by their prescription, 23
31. How ill the necessary truths hare fared in Germany and in our own country, 24
32. Secondly, How is the unsatisfactory state of philosophy to be remedied? Short answer, 26
33. A remedial system uniting truth and reason, not impossible, 28
34. Single canon for the right use of reason, 28
35. This system of Institutes claims both truth and demonstration, but rather demonstration than truth, 29
36. It is a body of necessary truth. Its pretensions stated, 30
37. An objection to its method stated and obviated, 31
38. The polemical character of this system, 31
39. Why philosophy must be polemical. She exists only to correct the inadvertencies of ordinary thinking, 32
40. This might be abundantly proved by the testimony of philosophers, 33
41. The object (or business to do) of philosophy renders her essentially polemical, 33
42. The charge of disrespect which might be supposed to attach to philosophy on account of her polemical character, obviated, 34
43. This system also adverse to psychology—and why, 34
44. What philosophy has to do, again distinctly stated, 36
45. Its positive object still more distinctly stated. Definition of metaphysics, 36
46. Why philosophy undertakes this object, 38
47. How philosophy goes to work. Adherence to canon—proposition and counter-proposition, 38
48. Further explanations as to how philosophy goes to work, 40
49. Advantages of this method, 41
50. Disadvantages of not contrasting distinctly the true and the false, 41
51. General unintelligibility of systems is due to their neglect to exhibit this contrast, 42
52. This system contrasts distinctly the true and the false, 45
53. The three sections of this institute. Arrangement explained and proved to be essential (§§ 54-62), 46
54. The section called ontology naturally comes first,—but is truly last in order, 46
55. It must be made to revolve away from us, in order to bring round the epistemology, which, though it naturally comes last, is truly first in order, 47
56. Epistemology and ontology the two main divisions of philosophy, 49
57. The epistemology does of itself afford no entrance to ontology. Why not?, 49
58. Because "Absolute Existence" may be that which we are ignorant of, 50
59. This consideration necessitates a new section of philosophy called the agnoiology. Its business, 50
60. Now we can settle the problem of ontology—and how, 51
61. Recapitulation of the three sections. 1. Epistemology. 2. Agnoiology. 3. Ontology. This arrangement not arbitrary, but necessary, 52
62. The necessity of keeping these divisions perfectly distinct, 52
63. The natural oversights of thought are rectified in these three sections, 53