Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/11

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CONTENTS.
vii
64. Remarks obviating any objections to the system, on the ground that its conclusions cannot at all times be present to the mind, 54
65. Continuation of these remarks, 56
66. Remark obviating any objection to this system on the score of presumption, 58
67. The indispensable extension of the necessary laws to all reason, 59
68. An objection to the system on the score of inconsistency obviated, 60
69. Objection retorted. The confusion of philosophers in regard to the conceivable and the inconceivable, 61
70. This confusion illustrated, 62
71. All other systems make game of the laws of thought, 63
72. The inconsistency of philosophers inextricable, 64
73. Their laws of thought always turn out, at best, to be mere laws of imagination, 65
74. This system does not make game of the laws of thought, 66
75. It abridges the grounds of controversy, 66
76. Conclusion of introduction explaining how the starting-point of philosophy is reached (§§ 76-85), 67
77. How the starting-point is reached, 67
78. Plato, in Theætetus, fails to reach the starting-point, 68
79. Search for the starting-point, 69
80. Why the question—What is knowledge? cannot be the starting-point, 71
81. This question resolved into two questions, 72
82. Which of them is our question,—and the first in philosophy, 72
83. That philosophy has a starting-point proved by the fact that its starting-point has been found, 73
84. Starting-point must state the essential of knowledge. Experience may confirm, but reason alone can establish its truth, 74
85. Re-statement of the first or proximate question of philosophy, 74
86. Its answer is the absolute starting-point, and forms the first proposition of these Institutes, 75
SECTION I.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY, OR THEORY OF KNOWING.
PROPOSITION I.
The Primary Law or Condition of All Knowledge, 79
Observations and Explanations, 79
1. Prop. I. answers the first question of philosophy, 79
2. It expresses the most general and essential law of all knowledge, 80
3. It declares that self-consciousness is never entirely suspended when the mind knows anything, 81
4. Objection that self-consciousness seems at times to be extinct, 81
5. Objection obviated. Proposition explained, 81
6. Our apparent inattention to self accounted for by the principle of familiarity, 82