PROP. IV.————
dence of its independent existence. But failing this knowledge, it is difficult to understand on what ground its existence per se can be advocated or established. Of course, its existence per se is, at the present stage of the discussion, neither admitted nor denied. But this much may be said, that it would be a monstrous fallacy—and one which we would very unwillingly charge our popular psychology with—to conclude that matter which was only known, and could only be known to exist cum alio, or not independently, therefore existed per se, or independently. That, assuredly, would be a nonsequitur. We must therefore hold that the teaching of psychology is, in its scope and tendency at least, identical with the fourth counter-proposition, which declares (in opposition to a strict demonstrated truth) that matter per se is, or can be, known.
Psychological materialism as founded on the four counter-propositions.6. Observe, in further corroboration of what has been announced as the psychological doctrine, what a consistent scheme of materialism arises out of our four counter-propositions. Firstly, It is not necessary that we should know ourselves in order to know other things. Secondly, Any object, therefore, may be known by us, without ourselves being known along with it. Thirdly, Therefore the mere objective part of our knowledge is, or may be, a unit of cognition. Fourthly, Therefore matter per se, which is the mere objective part of our knowledge, is or