Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/153

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THEORY OF KNOWING.
125

PROP. IV.————

may be known by us. Fifthly, Therefore matter per se exists. The logic of that sorites which, we believe, contains the sole psychological argument in favour of the existence of matter per se, is impregnable. Unfortunately the starting-point and the three subsequent counter-propositions are false and contradictory, and are therefore altogether incompetent to support the conclusion—however true that conclusion may be in itself.

Fallacy of materialism. Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions.7. The fallacy of this argument will be still more apparent, and the grounds of idealism will be further opened up, if we set against it the first four propositions of the system. Firstly, it is necessary that self should always be known, if anything is to be known. Secondly, Therefore no object can be known without self being known. Thirdly, Therefore the mere objective part of knowledge is always less than the unit or minimum of cognition. Fourthly, Therefore matter per se, which is the mere objective part of our knowledge and less than the unit of cognition, cannot by any possibility be known by us. Fifthly, Therefore no argument in favour of the existence of matter per se can be deduced from our knowledge of matter per se—because we have, and can have, no such knowledge. Of course, no conclusion is deducible from these premises to the effect that matter per se does not exist. All that the premises do is to cut away the grounds of materialism, and