THEORY OF KNOWING.
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PROP. IX.————
—is absolutely unknowable; and, therefore, if the reader expects a proof of the existence of himself as a completed immaterial entity, irrespective of his association with all particular things, and all determinate states, he must for ever be disappointed: at least he can obtain no redress on this point at the hands of speculation; nor does any redress appear to be at all needed.
Another objection obviated.17. Secondly, It may be said that the doctrine of the absolute unknowableness of the ego per se, and its reduction to a contradiction when in this predicament, may have the effect of depriving the mind of its fundamental substantiality; and that, according to this view, it must be little better than a nonentity when in a state of absolute indetermination. The answer is, Who cares although the doctrine has this effect? Who cares to exist, if he does not exist in some particular way, or in some determinate condition, or in association with something or other? To find the value of an existence of which there is, and can be, no cognisance, is a problem in metaphysical arithmetic which may be left to the psychologists to solve. In the opinion of speculation, such an existence is of no value at all. It seems quite sufficient for every reasonable wish, that a man's substantial existence should always consist of himself in some determinate condition, or of himself along with something else. All