wish to reach as to the originality of thought. This further conclusion cannot be reached at once. We must reach it through an intermediate conclusion, through the conclusion, namely, that thought is free. This, then, is our proximate aim. Out of the data which we have reached as to the nature of thought I shall endeavour to prove to you that thought is necessarily free.
20. Facts are, in general, more intelligible than speculations, and also, in general, more satisfactory. I shall therefore endeavour to show you what the facts are in virtue of which I pronounce thought to be free. These facts will show you what we mean by saying that thought is free. We have seen that when a man feels a sensation, and that when, moreover, he thinks this sensation, he thinks not only it, but something more than it. He thinks it as one of which there are or may be other instances. He thinks it as one of a class of sensations. He places it under a general notion, under a category or universal. He does this as a matter of fact. Now, what is implied in this fact? In that fact there is implied this further fact, that the man's thought frees or disengages itself from the particular sensation which is felt, and takes into account other sensations as well. It thinks the present impression as an instance which may occur again, as an example, a specimen, a type which may be repeated; and thinking it as such, it of course thinks virtually of other
