cases. But in thinking other cases, it necessarily travels out of and beyond the particular case before it. But in travelling beyond this particular case, it of course frees itself from it. Thought is not tied down to this or to any particular case; if it were, there would be no thought, there would be mere sensation. What is meant, then, by our saying that thought is free is simply this: we thereby express the fact that thought is not restricted and bound down to the particular sensation felt, but frees itself from it in the very act of taking into account something more, that is to say, other impressions which are not felt, but which are virtually thought of, in addition to the one which actually engages the mind. The two facts, then, in virtue of which we pronounce thought to be free, are, first, the fact that thought always travels beyond the particular sensation or impression which engages it, and takes in something more; and, second, the fact that, in doing so, thought is necessarily free, that is to say, it frees itself from the particular sensation or impression referred to, it is not engaged by it exclusively.
21. It is of the utmost consequence that you should verify in your own consciousness the truths in regard to thought and sensation which I have laid before you, and which I have yet to lay before you. You must practise the γνῶθι σεαυτόν, otherwise all that I am saying will go for nothing. There is one thing, however, which I must impress upon you
