Page:Ford, Kissinger, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin - September 12, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1552784).pdf/3

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3.

We have had four wars in 26 years and not a day of peace. We can defend ourselves but we need the means. Our military capability is a national obsession. There is national consensus in Israel on the need for a strong defense capability. This is the key to our survival.

The second is the political issue. As a result of the last war, the Arabs now know how to combine oil, diplomatic pressure and force to move or force political movement. Therefore we believe the present disengagement and ceasefire would not be transferred to another situation.

I don't think the Arabs are prepared for a final settlement, especially Syria.

Kissinger: Not on terms you can accept.

Rabin: In Egypt, Sadat has said that all he can do, even for a total Israeli withdrawal, is non-belligerency. Therefore, they are not ready for peace. Since we need peace and security (which means secure boundaries), the gap between the two sides I think cannot be bridged today. Therefore, I doubt success of negotiations on an overall settlement -- but we are ready to try.

Kissinger: The Arabs would be willing, but on the basis of the '67 frontiers, a solution to the Palestinians, etc., which guarantees no settlement.

Rabin: So there is another option -- to move gradually toward peace. We can accept a smaller move not solely in a military context but only in the context of political moves to peace. We fear salami tactics, by which we give up territory and get only words, which can be changed. The more we move the worse our military situation becomes. There is a school which says -- and we will keep the existing agreements on a mutual basis -- that if we have to fight, we should do it on these lines. If we are only gaining time, let's stay where we are.

But we want to move -- if it is a real move to peace and if we gain time. We want an economic infrastructure to be built, especially in Egypt -- which will create new conditions in Egypt. In principle we see the possibility to do this with Egypt. There is also a possibility with Jordan. It will be more difficult, but possible, preferably after Egypt. With Syria I can't see anything now.

My Government can be criticized for taking risks. We have to, but bear in mind the salami tactics. The Soviet Union will try to have Kissinger get more concessions from Israel, then move to salami tactics.


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