Syllabus
Second, the Union argues that workers do not forfeit the NLRA’s protections simply by commencing a work stoppage when the loss of perishable products is foreseeable, but this case involves much more than that. Given the lifespan of wet concrete, Glacier could not batch it until a truck was ready to take it. By reporting for duty and pretending as if they would deliver the concrete, the drivers prompted the creation of the perishable product. Then, they waited to walk off the job until the concrete was mixed and poured in the trucks. In so doing, they not only destroyed the concrete but also put Glacier’s trucks in harm’s way.
Third, the Court acknowledges that the Union’s decision to initiate the strike during the workday and failure to give Glacier specific notice do not themselves render the Union’s conduct unprotected. Still, these actions are relevant considerations in evaluating whether strikers took reasonable precautions, whether harm to property was imminent, and whether that danger was foreseeable. See International Protective Services, Inc., 339 N. L. R. B. 701, 702–703. Here, the Union’s choice to call a strike after its drivers had loaded a large amount of wet concrete into Glacier’s delivery trucks strongly suggests that it failed to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, aggravated, and imminent harm to Glacier’s property.
Finally, while the Union maintains that the drivers took some steps to protect the trucks, the Union concedes that the NLRA does not arguably protect its actions if those actions posed a material risk of harm to the trucks. Given that Glacier alleges that the Union took affirmative steps to endanger Glacier’s property rather than reasonable precautions to mitigate that risk, the NLRA does not arguably protect the Union’s conduct. Pp. 8–12.
198 Wash. 2d 768, 500 P. 3d 119, reversed and remanded.
