Court of Chicago; also the following written application prepared by her, and moved the court that she be admitted:
To the Honorable the Judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois: Now comes your petitioner, Myra Bradwell, a resident of Chicago, Ill., over twenty-one years of age, and presents to your honors, under rule 76 of this honorable court, the certificate of the Hon. E. S. Williams, Judge of the Circuit Court for the Seventh District, and the Hon. Charles H. Reed, State's Attorney for the said circuit, stating that they have examined your petitioner and found her qualified to practice law, and recommend that a license issue to her for that purpose, and also a certificate as to character from the Superior Court of Chicago, as required by the statute and the rule aforesaid, and moves your honors that an order of this honorable court may be entered directing a license to be given to your petitioner. Your petitioner suggests that the only question involved in her case is—Does being a woman disqualify her under the laws of Illinois from receiving a license to practice law?—and claims that the Legislature has answered this question in the negative. The first section of chapter eleven of the Revised Statutes, in regard to the admission of attorneys, is as follows:
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor-at-law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any action, suit, or plaint, in which he is not a party concerned, in any court of record within this State, either by using or subscribing his own name or the name of any other person without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from some two of the Justices of the Supreme Court, which license shall constitute the person receiving the same an attorney and counselor-at-law, and shall authorize him to appear in all the courts of record within this State, and there to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law, according to the laws and customs thereof, for and during his good behavior in said practice, and to demand and receive all such fees as are or hereafter may be established for any services which he shall or may render as an attorney or counselor-at-law in this State.
Your petitioner claims that the pronoun he, not only in this section, but the whole chapter, is used indefinitely for any person, and may refer to either a man or woman.
The Legislature devoted the whole of chapter 90 to construing various expressions and words used in the Revised Statutes, and in section 28 said:
When any party or person is described or referred to by words importing the masculine gender, females as well as males shall be deemed to be included.
It is declared by Act No. 29, appendix to the Revised Statutes, that the several chapters composing the Revised Statutes shall be deemed and taken as one act.
It is evident that if a woman should practice law without a license, recover for her services, and be sued for three times the amount, that under Sec. 11 of Chap. 11 for practicing law without a license, it would be no defense for her to say that the masculine pronoun was used in this section.
Section 3 of our Declaration of Rights, says "that all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God," etc. It will not be contended that women are not included within this provision.