The 8th section declares “that no freeman shall be imprisoned or dis- seized of his freehold,” etc., but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Will woman be deprived of the guarantees in this section and the right of trial by jury because the masculine pronoun is used? Under the 11th section no man’s property can be taken or applied to public use without the.consent, etc. Is not the property of a woman as secure under this provision as that of a man? In the chapter upon forcible entry and detainer, the masculine pronoun is used throughout, but no court would hesitate for a moment in holding a woman to be within its provisions if she should wrongfully hold possession of premises.
In the whole Chancery Code of this State, consisting of 53 sections, the word woman, female, she, her, herself, or any other feminine pronouns are not to be found, while in the 5th, 8th, 15th, 18th, 19th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 36th, 37th, and 46th, and some others, the masculine pronouns frequently occur. The same construction that would exclude a woman from the provisions of the statute in regard to the admission of attorneys, would place her without the Chancery Code. Yet no respectable attorney would claim because defendants in chancery are represented in the law by masculine pronouns, that a woman could not be made a defendant in chancery.
All of which is respectfully submitted. Myyra Bradwell.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COURT.
No order having been entered or opinion filed in this case, on the seventh of October the applicant received from the court, through Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Supreme Court Reporter, the following communication :
| State Of Illinois, Supreme Court, Third Grand | |
| Division, Clerk’S Office, Ottawa, Oct. 6, 1869. |
Mrs. Myra Bradwell—Madam: The court instruct me to inform you that they are compelled to deny your application for a license to practice as an attorney-at-law in the courts of this State, upon the ground that you would not be bound by the obligations necessary to be assumed where the relation of attorney and client shall exist, by reason of the disability imposed by your married condition—it being assumed that you are a married woman.
Applications of the same character have occasionally been made by per- sons under twenty-one years of age, and have always been denied upon the same ground that they are not bound by their contracts, being under a legal disability in that regard.
Until such disability shall be removed by legislation, the court regards itself powerless to grant your application.
The applicant, satisfied that under the common law, as modified by our statutes, she could not properly be denied a license to practice law solely upon the ground of her married condition, on the 18th of November filed the following printed argument :
ADDITIONAL BRIEF.
In the Supreme Court of Illinois— Third Grand Divisio—September Term,
1869. [In the matter of the application of Myra Bradwell to obtain a license