Thus the statute became law which transferred to the English courts of law the power so long claimed and exercised by the Roman See. There are two aspects under which it may be regarded, as there were two objects for which it was passed. Considered as a national Act, few persons will now deny that it was as just in itself as it was politically desirable. If the Pope had no jurisdiction over English subjects, it was well that he should be known to have none; if he had, it was equally well that such jurisdiction should cease. The question was not of communion between the English and Roman Churches, which might or might not continue, but which this Act would not affect. The Pope might still retain his rights of episcopal precedency, whatever those might be, with all the privileges attached to it. The Parliament merely declared that he possessed no right of interference in domestic disputes affecting persons and property.
But the Act had a special as well as a national bearing, and here it is less easy to arrive at a just conclusion. It destroyed the validity of Queen Catherine's appeal; it placed a legal power in the hands of the English judges to proceed to pass sentence upon the divorce; and it is open to the censure which we ever feel entitled to pass upon a measure enacted to meet the particular position of a particular person. When embarrassments have arisen from unforeseen causes, we have a right to legislate to prevent a repetition of those embarrassments. Our instincts tell us that no legislation should be retrospective, and should affect only positions which have
