Page:ISC-China.pdf/145

METHODOLOGY: COVERT

372. While China is adept at exploiting legitimate routes to advance technologically, it also utilises the full range of its espionage capabilities. The NCSC told the Committee:

     to fulfil any national strategic outcome … [the Chinese Communist Party] will use the [intelligence] capabilities they've got-be it cyber espionage [or] human espionage—and they really don't seek a distinction... of using those capabilities for purely national security reasons. They see the whole spectrum of strategic national outcomes as being fair game for those capabilities.^[1]

373. China uses its covert capabilities to target other countries' technology, IP and data in order to—as previously noted—"bypass costly and time-consuming research, development and training".^[2] This gives it a significant commercial advantage and, over time, strategic advantage.
374. This looks set to continue—and to increase: ***.^[3] ***.^[4]

 

Human intelligence

375. The ChIS have *** human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. They seek to identify individuals who have access to sensitive information which is of particular value to them—"*** providing easier access to otherwise restricted UK military or commercially sensitive information".^[5] For example, China uses opportunities provided by ***, or by social media to recruit individuals. MI5 told us that:

     the use of LinkedIn, the social/professional networking site, for example, is very widespread … well over *** UK-based individuals [have been] the subject of a very light initial approach ***, where someone is presenting [themselves] as maybe a consultant who is interested in an article this person may have written or wishes to invite them to a conference and … seeing whether they can suck this person into some … form of communication away from the LinkedIn site, perhaps email—and then maybe, if this develops, there is an invitation to a conference or a seminar, or somebody gets paid a small sum for writing an article …^[6]

376. ***.^[7] ***.^[8]

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1. Oral evidence—NCSC, *** December 2020.
2. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
3. Written evidence—***, March 2020.
4. Written evidence—***, June 2019.
5. Written evidence—***, June 2019.
6. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
7. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
8. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.

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