Page:ISC-China.pdf/146

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CHINA

Chinese targeting of UK Industry

A UK-based *** expert was recruited by the ChIS when working at ***. They tasked him to exploit his role at a UK organisation to provide Intellectual Property, written reports, and *** referrals for other experts to travel to China. He also introduced UK experts with access to Chinese intelligence officers. ***.[1]

Another case involved ***[2] ***[3]

Visits and trade shows
  1. ***.[4] According to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Chinese delegates make more requests to visit defence industry and defence sites than any other nationality and are by far the most numerous nationality to visit sites controlled by the MoD's International Visits Control Office (IVCO), showing particular interest in sites connected to the aerospace sector.[5]
  2. The Committee was told that, whilst attending visits, Chinese delegates have ***, been extremely forward in their questioning, ignored instructions not to photograph items of interest, and may in some cases have smuggled cameras and recording equipment onto visit sites.[6] The Committee is concerned that such events may have been used to collect industrial information (potentially including IP) as well as personal information on individuals of interest working within the defence sector. ***[7]
  3. When we asked about the scale of the problem, MI5 told us:

    we do from time to time hear reports from *** of visits of whatever sort where Chinese individuals have sort of taken photographs when they've been told not to, that sort of thing … as a general rule, people in particularly advanced technology sectors, when they are receiving Chinese delegations, would be wise to be alert to the possibility that their visitors will be seeking to acquire more in depth insight or information than their host intends, so it pays to manage those kinds of visits carefully.[8]

    However, MI5 noted that to a certain extent some such activity might be expected from any foreign delegation, and emphasised the need to keep such incidents in proportion: "***".[9]

  4. When we asked the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) what more could be done to prevent the exploitation of trade shows, he acknowledged that there were significant difficulties in doing so, but suggested that instead the focus should be on ensuring that both

  1. Written evidence—JSTAT, August 2019.
  2. ***
  3. Written evidence—MI5, 31 July 2018; Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  4. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  5. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  6. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  7. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  8. Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.
  9. Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.

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