Page:ISC-China.pdf/176

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.

CHINA

  1. products to them.[1] In August 2021, the Biden Administration restricted US citizens from investing in 59 "Chinese companies that undermine the security or democratic values of the United States and our allies", one of which was CGN.[2]
  2. While CGN has not—at the time of writing—been the subject of a concerted US diplomatic offensive in quite the same way as Huawei, US officials have publicly warned the UK against dealing with CGN. For instance, The Times reported: "Christopher Ashley Ford, US assistant secretary [of State] for international security and non-proliferation, said the UK had been given intelligence showing China General Nuclear transferred technologies from civilian enterprise for military uses."[3] The Financial Times reported in August 2020 that, at a private meeting with MPs in July 2020, the (then) US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, raised the subject of CGN's activities in the UK.[4] CGN's interest in Hitachi's Wylfa project has led to objections from the US as well. The Sunday Times reported that "officials from the US State Department … have heaped pressure on" the Japanese industrial giant not to sell the project to the Chinese.[5]
  3. Somewhat surprisingly, witnesses told this Inquiry in October 2020 that they had not "had a direct conversation with [their] counterpart in the US about CGN".[6] They noted that their counterparts at the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) might have engaged in such conversations with US interlocutors but did not appear to know. In October 2020, the DNSA simply said that she "could well imagine it becoming more of a topic of conversation".[7] This lack of knowledge, or even interest, is surprising given the JSTAT and NCSC assessment that "it is likely that increased cooperation with ***.[8]
  4. Witnesses were keen to note that the current discussion on CGN should not be equated with the longstanding concerns over Huawei. ***:

    it is that there are not the same *** equities in what the UK is doing in its Civil Nuclear, that there are in Huawei and telecoms, which … is that sort of global web. ***.[9]

  5. The location of the sites in which the Chinese have invested has also proved contentious with the US. It has been reported that US officials have raised concerns with the UK Government about the prospect of CGN taking on the Moorside site, due to the site's proximity to BAE Systems' facility at Barrow-in-Furness (where the UK's nuclear

  1. 'US warning on Chinese nuke plans in Cumbria', Sunday Times, 16 December 2018; 'U.S. Blacklists China Nuclear Firms Accused of Aiding Military', Bloomberg, 15 August 2019.
  2. 'Fact Sheet: Executive Order addressing the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the People's Republic of China', White House, 3 June 2021.
  3. 'Spy warning on Chinese nuclear company', The Times, 25 October 2018.
  4. 'China tensions raise doubts over UK nuclear projects', Financial Times, 6 August 2020.
  5. 'Donald Trump warns Hitachi not to sell Anglesey nuclear site to China', Sunday Times, 28 June 2020.
  6. Oral evidence—NSS, *** October 2020.
  7. Oral evidence—NSS, *** October 2020.
  8. Written evidence—JSTAT and NCSC, 5 December 2018
  9. ***

166