Page:ISC-China.pdf/177

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.
Espionage and influence
  1. submarines are built; the two sites are 20 miles apart).[1]These are legitimate concerns ***. The JIC concluded that ***.[2]
  2. However, even if the UK makes a decision in regards to Chinese investment in nuclear based on its own national security concerns, the Chinese will see it as stemming from US concerns and pressure. In 2020, the JIC assessed:

    No matter how any [hypothetical] action [opposing a Chinese role at Bradwell] is presented to China ***[3]

The non-nuclear Energy Sector

Public attention has focused primarily on the Civil Nuclear sector, as does this Case Study. However, during our inquiry we did consider whether there was a similar threat to UK's non-nuclear Energy sector. In simple terms, the 'Energy' Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sector comprises all UK infrastructure associated with Energy which is not Civil Nuclear. There are three sub-sectors—electricity, gas and oil.[4]

China's interest in the non-nuclear Energy sector is primarily driven by its huge domestic demand for energy: China alone accounts for 25% of global daily energy consumption; its electricity requirements have quadrupled since 2000; it is the world's biggest consumer and producer of coal, which accounts for three-fifths of its energy use; and it is the world's largest oil importer.[5] However, with severe pollution and environmental damage posing a possible threat to popular support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it has also invested heavily in renewables (with the result that it now has a quarter of the world's solar panels, and a third of the world's wind turbines).[6]


  1. 'US warning on Chinese nuke plans in Cumbria', Sunday Times, 16 December 2018.
  2. Written evidence—JIO, 27 October 2017.
  3. Written evidence—JIO, 13 November 2020.
  4. 'CNI Series: Energy (Strategic cyber threat assessment)', NCSC, 2017. The electricity network is made up of assets that generate, transmit and distribute electricity across the UK (for example generation stations, substations, cable tunnels, switching equipment and control rooms managing the network). National Grid, SSE and Scottish Power are responsible for electricity transmission. There are considerable interdependencies between the electricity sector and other critical assets across other CNI sectors (such as telecommunications, finance and transport), meaning that of the Energy sub-sectors, electricity is perhaps the most important. The gas sector comprises assets such as gas platforms, terminals, storage facilities, odourisation plants, pressure reduction and compressor stations, and control rooms managing the network. The downstream gas sector includes 250,000km of pipelines (known as the National Transmission System), and 21m consumers. National Grid is the sole owner and operator for gas transmission, but no longer deals with gas distribution, which is handled by four companies: Northern Gas Networks, SGN, Cadent Gas, and Wales and West Utilities. The oil sector is made up of assets such as oil platforms, terminals, refineries, storage facilities, pumping stations, control rooms managing the network, and transport to the forecourts and airports. Pipelines are also part of the sector; a small number of these are owned by the UK Government, with the rest being owned by oil companies.
  5. 'China’s promised energy revolution', Financial Times, 20 November 2017.
  6. 'The world is investing less in clean energy', The Economist, 5 September 2019.

167