PART TWO: CASE STUDIES
PP. The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve political influence in the UK and economic advantage over the UK. China exerts influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students in order to control the narrative of debate about China—including through the use of Confucius Institutes in the UK—and it directs or steals UK academic research to obtain Intellectual Property in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise. However, the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.
QQ. In seeking political influence, there are obvious and repeated examples of Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK. Universities are reliant on student fees, and the vast number of Chinese students in the UK—it is striking that there are more than five times the number than for any other country—provides China with significant leverage, which it is not afraid to exert. Yet the Government had shown very little interest in warnings from Academia: at the time of drafting, there was no point of contact in the Government for those in the sector to seek advice on these issues.
RR. In its quest for economic advantage, China often acts in plain sight—directing, funding and collaborating on academic research for its own ends. In particular, it seeks to benefit the Chinese military through research on dual-use technologies, which is often unclassified in its early stages. There is a question as to whether academic institutions are alive to the threat posed by such collaboration, particularly given that they often accept transfer of Information Data and Intellectual Property as a condition of funding. While some have expressed concern, others seem to be turning a blind eye, happy simply to take the money.
SS. The UK Government must ensure that transparency around the source of foreign donations to Higher Education institutions is improved: a public register of donations must be created by the Department for Education and monitored by the State Threats Unit in the Home Office.
TT. Academia is also an 'easy option' when it comes to the theft of Intellectual Property, by taking advantage of collaborative projects to steal information which is less protected than it might be in the private sector or the Ministry of Defence, for example. The vast number of Chinese students—particularly post-graduates—in academic institutions in the UK that are involved in cutting-edge research must therefore raise concerns, given the access and opportunities they are afforded.
UU. At present, HMG still seems to be trying to understand the threat from Chinese students stealing Intellectual Property from UK Academia, or the Chinese subverting UK research to its own ends, at the most basic level—i.e. what it is they are trying to steal. There is still no comprehensive list of the areas of sensitive UK research that need protecting from China. Identifying these key areas of research must be a priority, and they must be communicated to Academia as a matter of urgency so that protective action can be taken. Unless and until this is done, then the UK is handing China a clear economic advantage over the UK, and indeed the rest of the world.
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