VV. Unlike other countries, such as the United States (US), the UK has taken no preventative action. This is particularly concerning, as US restrictions on Chinese students will make UK institutions more attractive to those seeking to gain Intellectual Property and expertise. The Research Collaboration Advice Team should submit a quarterly report on the progress and outcomes of its work to the State Threats Unit in the Home Office to ensure there is cross-government awareness of the scale of the issue.
WW. It is clear that the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is an effective tool. Once the Government has identified the sensitive areas of research that need protecting from China, consideration should be given to ensuring that ATAS certificates are required for foreign nationals undertaking post-graduate study in UK institutions in those areas. Furthermore, we recommend that ATAS be expanded to cover postgraduate doctoral study.
XX. Tackling the threat in relation to Academia could have been an example of the Fusion Doctrine working seamlessly—with each policy department clearly contributing to an overall goal. But, as in so many areas, the devolution of responsibility for security to policy departments means that the ball is being dropped on security. Policy departments still do not have the understanding needed and have no plan to tackle it.
YY. This must change: there must be an effective cross-government approach to Academia, with clear responsibility and accountability for countering this multifaceted threat. In the meantime, China is on hand to collect—and exploit—all that the UK's best and brightest achieve as the UK knowingly lets it fall between the cracks.
ZZ. China is seeking technological dominance over the West and is targeting the acquisition of Intellectual Property and data in ten key industrial sectors in which the Chinese Communist Party intends China to become a world leader—many of which are fields where the UK has particular expertise.
AAA. As this Committee has previously warned, the West is over-reliant on Chinese technology. As the role of technology in everyday life increases exponentially, so therefore the UK will be at an increasing disadvantage compared to China—with all the attendant risks for our security and our prosperity. British technology and innovation is therefore critical and must be robustly protected.
BBB. China's joined-up approach can be clearly seen from its use of all possible legitimate routes to acquire UK technology, Intellectual Property and data—from buy‑in at the 'front end' via Academia, to actual buying-in through licensing agreements and Foreign Direct Investment, to the exertion of control over inward investments and standards-setting bodies. Each represents an individual threat, but it is the cumulative threat that can now be clearly seen.
CCC. Overt acquisition routes have been welcomed by HMG for economic reasons, regardless of risks to national security. The threat to future prosperity and independence was discounted in favour of current investment. This was short-sighted, and allowed China to develop significant stakes in various UK industries and Critical National Infrastructure.
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