Page:ISC-China.pdf/26

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

CHINA

  1. This has been demonstrated over the past few years, with the Chinese government proving extremely sensitive to UK Government comments on the Hong Kong protests in 2019—in a press conference in July 2019, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK said, "I tell [the UK Government]: hands off Hong Kong and show respect. This colonial mind-set is still haunting the minds of some officials or politicians"[1]—and threatening curtailment of Chinese investment in the UK following HMG's announcement of the British National (Overseas) visa scheme[2].[3] A number of our External Expert witnesses were clear that Hong Kong had become a personal project for President Xi and that he felt he had to be seen as victorious in the pursuit of his policy. Any move by the UK is viewed as interference in internal affairs and is responded to in an aggressive manner.[4]
  2. These factors would appear to place the UK just below China's top priority targets, as it seeks to build support for its current 'core interests', to mute international criticism and to gain economically. In respect of the latter, China sees the UK as a home for Chinese investment. The JIC Chair told us:

    [China] sees us as an important financial and commercial centre. It is no accident that of course the United Kingdom has been the major destination for Chinese investment in Europe since 2000, indeed I think by most estimates, if you add together investments in France, Germany and Italy, the United Kingdom still outstrips them. So there is a very strong commercial element.[5]

  3. China also values the UK in relation to both its technology industry and its education sector.[6] Lord Patten, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, observed:

    I think they probably think we are not entirely reliable useful idiots … I think they do take us quite seriously, though not as seriously as once was the case, and I think they regard us as an economic opportunity and as an opportunity to, through elite capture, through the cultivation of useful idiots, through playing on things like the 'Golden Age' of British China relations, getting us by and large corralled into doing the sort of things they would like us to do.[7]

    This approach can be seen in relation to Civil Nuclear energy: Chinese interest lies in gaining UK regulatory approval for its reactor designs as they assess that this will influence other countries to permit Chinese investment in their Civil Nuclear sectors. This is explored further in Part Two of this Report.

  1. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman also said: "The UK considers itself as a guardian [of Hong Kong] which is nothing but a delusion." The Ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office following these remarks. ('Britain summons Chinese Ambassador as he accuses Government of taking "wrong side" on Hong Kong', The Telegraph, 3 July 2019.)
  2. Under this scheme, an estimated 2.9m British National (Overseas) status holders were eligible to move to the UK with a further estimated 2.3m eligible dependants. (Hong Kong BN(O) visa: UK government to honour historic commitment', www.gov.uk/government/news/hong-kong-bno-visa-uk-government-to-honour-historic-commitment, 29 January 2021.)
  3. 'China-UK relations grow more strained over Huawei and Hong Kong', China Brief Jamestown, 31 August 2020.
  4. Oral evidence—External Experts, 9 May 2019.
  5. Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
  6. Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
  7. Oral evidence—Lord Patten (University of Oxford), 9 May 2019.

16