Page:ISC-China.pdf/74

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CHINA

  1. the prioritisation process that we have just gone through with the PM *** gives a really clear steer ***. So that gives the Agencies licence to operate on subjects with some discretion as to where you apply the resources.[1]

  2. We were provided with the agreed policy outcomes for 2020—including in relation to the 'Trading Safely', 'Countering Security Threats' and 'Digital and Technology' pillars—against which SIS and GCHQ must deliver intelligence ***. ***

X. In December 2020, we asked how the policy outcomes against which SIS and GCHQ must deliver intelligence were being prioritised. We presume, for instance, that "***" is not considered to be of the same importance as "***"; however, we have not been provided with any information. Without any indication of prioritisation, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of Agency efforts and it is therefore disappointing—and rather telling—that NSS has failed to provide such critical information in response to this major Inquiry.

The tri-Agency approach
  1. As set out in 2019, the Agencies take a tri-Agency approach ***. This is to ensure that—despite SIS and GCHQ having their priorities set by Ministers and MI5 being self-tasking—the Agencies can align at an operational level in terms of their contributions to the China Framework.[2]
  2. ***
  3. ***[3]
  4. The current tri-Agency approach *** had been agreed in June 2018. Not long afterwards the NSC produced the China Framework ***. In April 2019, the Agencies said they were in the process of reviewing their approach in order to align with the new China Framework. However, in October 2020, with no further update, we questioned what was happening and Director General MI5 told us:

    there is a logic I think to the next iteration [of our approach] … waiting until the Integrated Review and the Intelligence and Outcomes Prioritisation process have had their say, and then we respond to that, rather than sort of UKIC settling on something inside its own brain in advance of the top-level steer.[4]

    While we recognise that argument, we were surprised not to have been made aware of an updated approach whilst conducting our Inquiry—despite the Integrated Review having been published in March 2021, and the IOP Plan ***. (We were subsequently updated on the agreed revised approach in November 2021—after we had concluded our oral evidence sessions and therefore too late for us to question the Agencies on it in order to reflect it in this Report.) It is simply not efficient to have these levels of planning so unsynchronised.

  1. Oral evidence—*** December 2020.
  2. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  3. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  4. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.

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