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The 'Strategy': Frameworks, Plans and Pillars
  1. We also note that, as at 2019, DI is not included within the agreed tri-Agency approach ***. We were told that this is because DI was also not involved in the ICE process (the previous iteration of IOP) - its tasking/prioritisation is set by the Chief of Defence Staff.[1] When we asked what impact that had on joint working, MI5 told the previous Committee that the tri-Agency approach could, in time, include DI as the Agencies and DI are now engaging much more ***.[2]

Y. We were told in 2019 that the Agencies take a tri-Agency approach, but this does not cover DI. In October 2020—over 15 months later—we asked if there had yet been any movement towards formally adding DI to the prioritisation process. The Acting National Security Adviser told us: "DI are fully part of the IOP process … of our main repositories of expertise on China." Director GCHQ noted that DI is a part of the National Cyber Force, and "when you get into the effects world … they are completely there in every aspect."[3] If DI is supposedly now fully integrated with the Intelligence Outcomes Prioritisation process, we expect the next iteration of the tri-Agency approach—when it is finally updated—to include DI.

HMG Hostile State Activity Strategy
  1. In addition to the numerous levels of HMG's strategy on China, China also features in HMG's cross-cutting work on the threat posed by hostile activity carried out by states (as opposed to, for instance, terrorist organisations or serious organised crime groups).
  2. The Government developed a Hostile State Activity (HSA) Strategy in 2017, defining HSA as "overt or covert action orchestrated by foreign governments that undermines or threatens the UK's national security, the integrity of its democracy, its public safety, reputation or economic prosperity, short of armed conflict".[4]

Hostile State Activity

This Report uses the term 'Hostile State Activity', which was used by HMG and the Intelligence Community throughout their evidence provided for this Inquiry.

'Hostile State Activity' was used to describe the full range of threats posed by hostile state actors. The UK Intelligence Community's work on Hostile State Activity was explained as comprising counter-espionage and counter-intelligence activity:

  • Counter-espionage is the investigation of individuals (agents) who are suspected of passing sensitive information to foreign intelligence services.
  • Counter-intelligence means investigating the activities of the officers and agents of overseas intelligence services and disrupting them when necessary.

  1. Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2018.
  2. Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
  3. Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
  4. Written evidence—HMG, 21 August 2019.

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