Page:ISC-China.pdf/85

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DEFENDING THE UK


Responsibility
  1. Under the Security Services Act 1989, MI5 is responsible for countering Hostile State Activity (HSA), i.e. "protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage [and] from the activities of agents of foreign powers". In May 2019, MI5 had around *** full-time equivalent (FTE) staff working on State Threats—predominantly on counter-intelligence and counter-espionage but also on counter-proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism work. The HSA team primarily focuses on Russia, China and Iran but they also have a 'Rest of the World' remit.[1]
  2. MI5 also has responsibility for the Joint State Threats Assessment Team (JSTAT). JSTAT provides assessments and a holistic view on the national security threat posed by:
    • espionage;
    • assassination;
    • interference in our democracy and society;
    • threats to the UK's economic security, and
    • threats to the UK's people and assets overseas.[2]

    It therefore looks in depth at the threats from *** activity, as well as niche and emerging threats, and provides assessment for a wide range of government departments.[3]

  3. JSTAT works under MI5's legal authorisations. It is governed by a Board ***, and draws its staff from across government, including policy departments, MI5, DI, SIS and GCHQ. In 2019, the Committee was told that JSTAT had around *** analysts, *** of whom were working on China in February 2020 (the previous Committee was told that the intention was to increase that *** by the end of the financial year 2019/20).[4] By late 2020, the number had risen *** and the intention was for a further increase *** in 2021, subject to the outcome of the Spending Review.[5] MI5 explained that JSTAT was vital to countering the threat from China:

    So we have already clocked that we need to bolster how we are bringing together a fragmentary complex intelligence picture, mixing that with what is in the public domain, because, as I have said, a lot of the China intent is very public, and then using that to inform the security aspect of the judgement that then is part of informing Ministers and the Departments about the overall balance.[6]


  1. Written evidence—MI5, May 2019.
  2. Written evidence—MI5, May 2019.
  3. Written evidence—MI5, March 2020.
  4. Oral evidence—HMG, *** July 2019.
  5. Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
  6. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.

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