Page:ISC-China.pdf/86

CHINA

Focus and coverage

204. MI5's objectives in relation to HSA are to "seek those trying to pass sensitive UK information and equipment to other countries and ensure they don't succeed" (counter-espionage) and to "disrupt the actions of foreign intelligence officers where these are damaging to our country's interests" (counter-intelligence).^[1] MI5 told us that its role is spread across a range of areas, including investigating activity against UK interests both within the UK and abroad (as well as remotely online) ***. MI5 also has responsibility for detecting (and countering) "penetration of government, or the Agencies themselves for that matter" ***.^[2] MI5 told the Committee that:

     the MI5 role is clearly central on the counter-intelligence element ***^[3]

205. In 2020, *** of MI5's operational effort was focused on China.^[4] *** in order to counter the breadth of the China threat, MI5 has prioritised^[5] its efforts "***".^[6] MI5 told us that it was working on a number of areas relating ***, including:
     • HMG—attempts to penetrate the UK Intelligence Community and wider HMG ***;
     • ***;
     • Science and Technology—attempts to obtain sensitive UK defence technology ***;
     • ***;
     • ***;
     • ***; ^[7] and
     • Cyber—developing HMG's understanding ***.^[8]
206. ***^[9]
207. Although MI5 argued that the measures it was taking were proving to be effective, it also accepted that ***. Director General MI5 told us:

     We've built up quite an experience base now ***. So I don't think we are likely to be ***. Clearly that's in some ways not that different to the version I face of that around counter-terrorism, for example. ***.^[10]

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1. MI5 website.
2. Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
3. Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
4. Compared with ***% for Russia. ***% of MI5's effort is focused on counter-terrorism work. (Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.)
5. MI5 prioritises its work using the *** model. This model (***) aims to "drive operational outcomes ***". It is used to prioritise *** to ensure MI5 delivers long-term *** against its core intelligence requirements. (Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.)
6. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
7. Written evidence—MI5, 11 June 2019.
8. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
9. Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.
10. Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.

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