CHINA
- In 2019, GCHQ noted that its operational effort was similarly divided but with an additional focus on ***.[1] A year later, Director GCHQ told us that there were between *** and *** active Chinese cyber groups, and that GCHQ was able to cover ***.[2]
Requirements
- The outcomes—what the Government wants to achieve—in relation to China are set though the Intelligence Outcomes Prioritisation (IOP) process[3] (discussed in the earlier chapter on The Strategy). HMG says that the IOP process is designed to ensure that SIS and GCHQ's work accords with the priorities set by the National Security Council (NSC), so that the information and outcomes they provide will best serve the wide range of demands from their customer' departments in the Government. The IOP Plan is meant to set out the Government's priorities for SIS and GCHQ, to be delivered through 'coverage' and 'effects'.
- In October 2020, the Committee was provided with the China Policy Outcomes, set within the China IOP process. As opposed to the tasking document previously produced, we were informed that instead these outcomes "guide the setting of SIS & GCHQ contributions but are not themselves requirements for Agency coverage or effects" and that the policy outcomes "are not delivered by secret intelligence and effects alone".[4] However, this change in emphasis (reflective of the Fusion Doctrine) means that it is now not possible to establish to what extent SIS and GCHQ are individually responsible for any progress made against these outcomes—and therefore how their effectiveness or performance can be meaningfully assessed. We question the logic behind this.
- Nevertheless, we can examine the responsibilities of SIS and GCHQ by comparing the 2019 and 2018 Intelligence Coverage and Effects (ICE) Plans, which were tasking documents:
- ***[5]
- ***
When (in 2019) we asked about the 2018 ICE Plan, SIS told us that:
***[6]
- Given that the ICE Plans were drawn up in consultation with SIS and GCHQ, it would suggest that the Cabinet Office and those Agencies felt that they were in a position to effect more real-world outcomes in 2019 than they were in 2018. This is reassuring, if that trajectory continues. Nevertheless, without knowing the current requirements set for both Agencies, we cannot judge what their current division of work is between finding out information and stopping the Chinese from doing things that hurt UK interests.
- ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
- ↑ The IOP process was established in March 2020, although as previously noted it may be reviewed following the Integrated Review.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 14 October 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 30 August 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
86
