Page:ISC-China.pdf/97

On the 'Offensive'

Coverage

242. Examples of GCHQ and SIS China 'coverage' work provided in 2018 include:
     • ***^[1]
     • ***^[2]
     • ***^[3]
243. Although not part of the IOP Plan, DI also works to a number of intelligence collection goals. There is a particular focus on ***.^[4]

 

Effects

244. Intelligence 'effects', also referred to as covert action, are SIS and GCHQ activities which have real-life outcomes. Effects work against hostile states was explored during the Russia Inquiry, when Committee Members were told that HMG does not deploy effects with the goal of effecting organisational collapse, in the way that they might be deployed against international terrorist groups, for example. As a result, the Agencies' effects work *** can involve capability-building (the sharing of knowledge and capabilities with partners), and counter-intelligence work to disrupt intelligence operations ***.^[5] More broadly, HMG can employ intelligence diplomacy (the use of intelligence information and relationships to influence international action), which can range from using intelligence partnerships to build alliances or encourage action on a particular issue, to the maintenance of alternative diplomatic channels with governments or non-state actors with which it is considered impolitic to have overt diplomatic relations. According to the evidence provided to the Committee in this Inquiry, the same principles broadly apply to SIS and GCHQ's work on China ***. When we questioned GCHQ in 2019, we were told that:

     ***^[6]

245. As noted previously, the 2018 China ICE Plan ***.^[7] This was being delivered through a counter-cyber programme known as Operation WINDERMERE.^[8]

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1. Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 October 2018.
2. Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 October 2018.
3. Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 October 2018.
4. Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
5. Russia, HC 632, 21 July 2020.
6. Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
7. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
8. In some instances in this Report, we have substituted an ISC-specific code word where it has been necessary to refer to the name of an operation or project, in order to protect classified information. No significance is intended by, nor should be inferred from, the matching of code words to real operation names. The ISC code words have no operational significance.

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