men, humanus legislator fidelis superiore carens. If the making of laws be entrusted to a few, we should not be secure against error or self-seeking: only the whole people can know what it needs and can give effect to it. The community therefore of all the citizens or their majority, expressing its will either by elected representatives or in their assembled mass, is the supreme power in the state.[1]
But it must have an officer to execute its behests, and for this purpose the people must choose itself a ruler. In Marsiglio's view election is the only satisfactory form of monarchy: to the hereditary principle he will make no concession whatever. There must be, he says, a unity in the government; but a unity of office, not necessarily of number: so that the executive functions may be as effectively exercised by means of a committee as by a single prince; only no member of such a committee must venture to act by himself separately, its policy must be directed by the vote or by a majority of the entire body. If however, as is usually the wiser course, a king be chosen, he must be supported by an armed force, large enough, according to the rule of Aristotle, to overpower the few but not large enough to overpower the mass of the nation. But this force is not to be entrusted to him until after his election, for a man must not secure the royal dignity by means of external resources, but by virtue of his own personal qualities.
The desirability of an universal monarchy Marsiglio
- ↑ Nos autem dicamus secundum veritatem atque consilium Aristotelis, 3 politicae, ca. 6, legis latorem, seu causam legis effectivam primam et propriam, esse populum, seu civium universitatem aut eius valentiorem partem, per suam electionem seu voluntatem in generali civium congregatione per sermonem expressam, praecipientem seu determinantem aliquid fieri seu omitti circa civiles actus humanos sub poena vel supplicio temporali: valentiorem, inquam, partem, considerata quantitate in communitate illa super quam lex fertur, sive id fecerit universitas praedicta civium aut eius pars valentior per se ipsam immediate, sive id alicui vel aliquibus commiserit faciendum ... Et dico consequenter huic quod eadem auctoritate prima non alia debent leges et aliud quodlibet per electionem institutum approbationem necessariam suscipere, &c.: Defensor pacis i. 12 pp. 169 sq.
