36. Defendants and their co-conspirators also created and controlled numerous Twitter accounts designed to appear as if US. persons or groups controlled them. For example, the ORGANIZATION created and controlled the Twitter account “Tennessee GOP,” which used the handle @TEN_GOP. The @TEN_GOP account falsely claimed to be controlled by a US. state political party. Over time, the @TEN_GOP account attracted more than 100,000 online followers. 37. To measure the impact of their online social media operations, Defendants and their co- conspirators tracked the performance of content they posted over social media. They tracked the size of the online U.S. audiences reached through posts, different types of engagement with the posts (such as likes, comments, and reposts), changes in audience size, and other metrics. Defendants and their co-conspirators received and maintained metrics reports on certain group pages and individualized posts.
38. Defendants and their co-conspirators also regularly evaluated the content posted by specialists (sometimes referred to as “content analysis”) to ensure they appeared authentic—as if operated by US. persons. Specialists received feedback and directions to improve the quality of their posts. Defendants and their co-conspirators issued or received guidance on: ratios of text, graphics, and video to use in posts; the number of accounts to operate; and the role of each account (for example, difi‘erentiating a main account from which to post information and auxiliary accounts to promote a main account through links and reposts).
Use of US. Computer Infrastructure
39. To hide their Russian identities and ORGANIZATION affiliation, Defendants and their co- conspirators—particularly POLOZOV and the ORGANIZATION’S IT department—purchased space on computer servers located inside the United States in order to set up virtual private
networks (“VPNs”). Defendants and their co-conspirators connected from Russia to the US.-
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