based infrastructure by way of these VPNs and conducted activity inside the United States— including accessing online social media accounts, opening new accounts, and communicating with real U.S. persons—while masking the Russian origin and control of the activity.
40. Defendants and their co-conspirators also registered and controlled hundreds of webbased email accounts hosted by US. email providers under false names so as to appear to be US. persons and groups. From these accounts, Defendants and their co-conspirators registered or linked to online social media accounts in order to monitor them; posed as US. persons when requesting assistance from real U.S. persons; contacted media outlets in order to promote activities inside the United States; and conducted other operations, such as those set forth below.
MW 41. In or around 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators also used, possessed, and
transferred, without lawful authority, the social security numbers and dates of birth of real U.S. persons without those persons’ knowledge or consent. Using these means of identification, Defendants and their co-conspirators opened accounts at PayPal, a digital payment service provider; created false means of identification, including fake driver’s licenses; and posted on ORGANIZATION-controlled social media accounts using the identities of these U.S. victims. Defendants and their co-conspirators also obtained, and attempted to obtain, false identification documents to use as proof of identity in connection with maintaining accounts and purchasing advertisements on social media sites.
Actions Tar etin 016 P idential Electi
42. By approximately May 2014, Defendants and their co-conspirators discussed efforts to interfere in the 2016 US. presidential election. Defendants and their co-conspirators began to monitor U.S. social media accounts and other sources of information about the 2016 US.
presidential election.
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