4. The downing of Iran Air 655 was not the result of any negligent or culpable conduct by any U.S. Naval personnel associated with the incident.
5. Based on the information available to CJTFME, his confidence in CAPT Rogers and the capabilities of USS VINCENNES, his concurrence to engage TN 4131 was correct.
6. The AEGIS Combat System's performance was excellent - it functioned as designed. Had the CO USS VINCENNES used the information generated by his C&D system as the sole source of his tactical information, the CO might not have engaged TN 4131.
7. Time compression played a significant role in the incident. From the time the CO first became aware of TN 4131 as a possible threat,. until he made his decision to engage, the elapsed time was approximately three minutes, 40 seconds. Additionally, the Commanding Officer's attention which was devoted to the ongoing surface engagement against IRGC forces (the "wolf closest to the sled"), left very little time for him to personally verify information provided to him by his CIC team in which he had great confidence. The fog of war and those human elements which affect each individual differently--not the least of which was the thought of the Stark incident--are factors that must be considered.
8. The digital data extracted from USS VINCENNES data recording tapes is valid and provided invaluable insights and information for the reconstruction of the events of 3 July 1988 including the evaluation of individual CIC console operator actions.
9. The Commanding Officer VINCENNES decision to engage TN 4131 was based primarily on the following:
(a) The aircraft had lifted off from an airfield used jointly by military and civilian aircraft in Iran heading directly toward his ship at a relatively low altitude.
(b) Track 4131 was CBDR to USS VINCENNES and USS MONTGOMERY.
(c) TN 4131 was flying at a reported altitude which was lower than USS VINCENNES observed COMAIR to fly previously. Additionally, it was not flying exactly on the airway centerline as USS VINCENNES had seen previous COMAIR consistently do.
(d) It appeared to veer toward the USS MONTGOMERY.
(e) Track 4131 was reported to be increasing in speed, decreasing in altitude, and closing range.
(f) No ESM was reflected from track 4131, however, F-14s
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