Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/19

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Preface.
xi

without an encouragement of informers and ſpies, throughout every part of the ſtate, who interrupt the tranquillity of private life, deſtroy the confidence of families in their own domeſtics and one another, and poiſon freedom in its ſweeteſt retirements. In a free government, on the contrary, the miniſters can have no enemies of conſequence but among the members of the great or little council, where every man is obliged to take his ſide, and declare his opinion, upon every queſtion. This circumſtance alone, to every manly mind, would be ſufficient to decide the preference in favour of a free government. Even ſecrecy, where the executive is entire in one hand, is as eaſily and ſurely preſerved in a free government as in a ſimple monarchy; and as to diſpatch, all the ſimple monarchies of the whole univerſe may be defied to produce greater or more examples of it than are to be found in Engliſh hiſtory.—An Alexander, or a Frederic, poſſeſſed of the prerogatives only of a king of England, and leading his own armies, would never find himſelf embarraſſed or delayed in any honeſt enterprize. He might be reſtrained, indeed, from runing mad, and from making conqueſts to the ruin of his nation, merely for his own glory: but this is no argument againſt a free government.—There can be no free government without a democratical branch in the conſtitution. Monarchies and ariſtocracies are in poſſeſſion of the voice and influence of every univerſity and academy in Europe. Democracy,

ſimple