whereas, if you admit the people to a ſhare in the government, no miſchief can ſpring from the ſenate; but the man who aims at greater power than the reſt of his fellow citizens, and has formed a faction in the ſenate, of all who are willing to partake of his councils and his crimes (for thoſe who deliberate concerning public affairs ought to forefee every thing that is probable) this great, this awful perſon, I fay, when called by the tribunes to appear before the people, muſt give an account both of his actions and thoughts to this people, inconſiderable as they are, and ſo much his inferiors; and, if found guilty, ſuffer the puniſhment he deſerves: and, leſt the people themſelves, when veſted with ſo great a power, ſhould grow wanton, and, fſduced by the worſt of demagogues, become dangerous to the beſt of citizens, (for the multitude generally give birth to tyranny) ſome perſon of conſummate prudence, created dictator by yourſelves, will guard asainſt this evil, and not allow them to run into exceſs; and being inverted with abſolute power, and ſubject to no account, will cut off the infected part of the commonwealth, and not ſuffer that which is not yet infected to be vitiated, reform the laws, excite the citizens to virtue, and appoint ſuch magiſtrates as he thinks will govern with the greateſt prudence: and having effected theſe things within the ſpace of fix months, he will again become a private man, without receiving any other reward for theſe actions, than that of being honoured for having performed them. Induced, therefore, by theſe conſiderations, and convinced that this is the moſt perfect form of government, debar the people from nothing; but as you have granted them a power of chooſing the annual magiſtrates, who are to preſide over
