the commonwealth, of confirming and repealing laws, of declaring war, and making peace, which are the greateſt and moſt important affairs that come under the conſideration of our government, not one of which you have ſubmitted to the abſolute determination of the ſenate, allow them, in like manner, the power of trying offenders, particularly ſuch as are accuſed of crimes againſt the ſtate, of raiſing a ſedition, of aiming at tyranny, of concerting meaſures with our enemies to betray the commonwealth, or of any other crimes of the like nature; for the more formidable you render the tranſgreſſion of the laws, and the alteration of diſcipline, by appointing many inſpectors, and many guards over the inſolent and the ambitious, the more will your conſtitution be improved."
It is ſurpriſing that Valerius ſhould talk of an equal mixture of monarchical, ariſtocratical, and democratical powers, in a commonwealth where they were ſo unequally mixed as they were in Rome. There can be no equal mixture without a negative in each branch of the legiſlature. But one example of an equal mixture has ever exiſted in Europe, and that is in England. The conſuls in Rome had no negative; the people had a negative, but a very unequal one, becauſe they had not the ſame time and opportunity for cool deliberation. The appointment of tribunes was a very inadequate remedy. What match for a Roman ſenate was a ſingle magiſtrate ſeated among them? his abilities could not be equal; his firmneſs could not be always depended on: but what is worſe, he was liable to be intimidated, flattered, and bribed. It is really aſtoniſhing, that ſuch people as Greeks and Romans ſhould ever have thought four or five epheri, or a ſingle tribune,
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