Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/290

reposing the power in a single hand. At the same time, they have considered with equal propriety, that a numerous legislature was best adapted to the duties of legislation, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people, and to secure their privileges and interests.^[1] Montesquieu has said, that

the executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of government, having need of despatch, is better administered by one, than by many. On the other hand, whatever depends on the legislative power is oftentimes better regulated by many, than by a single person. But if there were no monarch, and the executive power should be committed to a certain number of persons, selected from the legislative body, there would be an end to liberty; by reason, that the two powers would be united, as the same persons would sometimes possess, and would always be able to possess, a share in both.^[2]

De Lolme, in addition to other advantages, considers the unity of the executive as important in a free government, because it is thus more easily restrained.^[3] "In those states," says he,

where the execution of the laws is entrusted to several different hands, and to each with different titles and prerogatives, such division, and such changeableness of measures, which must be the consequence of it, constantly hide the true cause of the evils of the state. Sometimes military tribunes, and at others consuls bear an absolute sway. Sometimes patricians usurp every thing; and at other times those, who are called nobles. Sometimes the people are oppressed by de-

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1. The Federalist, No. 70.
2. Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, B. 11, ch. 6.
3. De Lolme on Const. of England, B. 2, ch. 2.