Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/291

cemvirs; and at others by dictators. Tyranny in such states does not always beat down the fences, that are set around it; but it leaps over them. When men think it confined to one place, it starts up again in another. It mocks the efforts of the people, not because it is invincible, but because it is unknown. But the indivisibility of the public power in England has constantly kept the views and efforts of the people directed to one and the same object.^[1]

He adds, in another place, "we must observe a difference between the legislative and executive powers. The latter may be confined, and even is the more easily so, when undivided. The legislature on the contrary, in order to its being restrained, should absolutely be divided."^[2]

§ 1414. That unity is conducive to energy will scarcely be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of a greater number; and in proportion, as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.^[3]

§ 1415. This unity may be destroyed in two ways; first, by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity; secondly, by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, however, in whole or in part to the control and advice of a council. Of the first, the two consuls of Rome may serve, as an example in ancient times; and in modern times, the brief and hasty

---

1. De Lolme on Const. of England, B. 2, ch. 2.
2. De Lolme on Const. of England, B.2, ch. 3. See also The Federalist, No. 70; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 13, p. 253 to 255.—The celebrated Junius (the great unknown) has pronounced De Lolme's work to be at once "deep, solid, and ingenious."
3. The Federalist, No. 70; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 13, p. 253, 254.