tice, and recognized by subsequent laws. But they insisted, as Webster expressed it, that Congress clearly had the power “of regulating the condition, duration, qualification, and tenure of office in all cases where the Constitution has made no express provision on the subject;” and that, therefore, it was “competent for Congress to declare by law, as one qualification of office, that the incumbent shall remain in place till the President shall remove him for reasons to be stated to the Senate.” This last proposition it is very difficult to controvert.
Clay went beyond the recommendation of the report. A year before, in March, 1834, he had proposed a series of resolutions, the gist of which he now moved by way of amendment, providing that in all instances of appointment to office by the President, with the consent of the Senate, the power of removal should be exercised only in concurrence with the Senate; but that during the vacation of the Senate, the President should have the power to suspend any such officer, with the duty to communicate his reasons for the suspension to the Senate during the first month of its succeeding session, when, if the Senate concurred with him, the officer should be removed, and, if the Senate did not concur, the officer should be reinstated. Clay was induced not to urge his amendment, and he dropped it. But it was destined to come to life again more than thirty years later, when, during President Johnson's administration, Congress em-
